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Inside and outside of the sphere of immigration law, liminal legal
statuses are proliferating. These legal categories function simultaneously
as a means to effectuate administrative resource conservation through
community-oriented risk management strategies and as a form of
"preservation through transformation" that enable governmental actors to
reassert and maintain control over populations identified as risky in ways
that do not trigger the rights-protective schemes that evolved both inter-
nationally and domestically in the mid-Twentieth Century. This Article
uses the existing literature on liminal legal subjects as a starting point for
understanding and critiquing the legal mechanisms that produce liminal
legality.
Part I discusses the taxonomical features of liminal legality identi-
fied in studies focusing on the life experiences of marginalized nonciti-
zens. These features include uncertainty about he scope of reprieve
from banishment, a reliance on administrative grace to effectuate free-
dom from banishment, an obligation to pay one's way to prevent that
banishment, experiences of heightened monitoring by governmental ac-
tors, and a related vulnerability to control, exclusion, and abuse by pri-
vate actors.
Part II tests the possibility of expanding notions of liminal legality
outside of the iconic cases of noncitizens granted temporary reprieves
from removal. This section expands the analysis first to other, more le-
gally privileged noncitizens, then to citizens in immigrant communities,
and finally to broader classes of citizens with relatively high rates of con-
tact with law enforcement agents. This analysis highlights the common-
alities of the legal structures that regulate and punish these diverse cate-
gories of individuals and communities that experience liminal legality.
Part III explores the potential benefits that transubstantive legal
analysis focusing on liminal legality offers over more subject-specific
frames like "crimmigration." Framing legal analysis in terms of liminal
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legality could both check unjustifiable presumptions of immigration law
exceptionality and foster the identification of the common regulatory
practices that have generated a broader social normalization of liminal
legality. Additionally, a focus on the legal production of liminal legality
may, in fact, open up a path to return crimmigration scholarship to its
deeper theoretical grounding in membership theory, thereby reinvigorat-
ing the discussion of the role that race, class, and place play in structur-
ing governance strategies both at the border of criminal and immigration
law and beyond it.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent sociological accounts focusing on immigrant communities
have used the concept of liminal legality to describe the status of legally
marginalized noncitizens. The term has its deeper scholarly roots in an-
thropological studies of the early Twentieth Century that focused on so-
cial ritual, including periods of liminality experienced by community
members. The more recent sociological accounts focus on liminality as a
temporally and socially uncertain transitional state of partial belonging
that arises out of marginal legal status. In the existing scholarly accounts,
the notion of liminal legality is used to describe individuals moving in
and out of, and living on the edges of, legal immigration status. The term
is understood in reference to the lived realities of these noncitizens, but
much of the existing literature does not seek to identify with specificity
the legal mechanisms that produce this liminal legality.
The legally imposed uncertainty captured by the concept of liminal
legality has the potential to serve as a more generalizable rubric under
710 [Vol. 92:4
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which to evaluate certain contemporary social and legal problems in reg-
ulation, policing, and punishment-one that can help illuminate compari-
sons across areas of substantive laws and among and between denizens
with varying formal legal citizenship and immigration statuses. Center-
ing experiences of liminal legality can help to illuminate some of the
commonalities of individuals who live on the edge of banishment effec-
tuated through combined civil and criminal enforcement mechanisms.
The age-old punitive method of banishment is an increasingly common
form of contemporary social control, and it is not limited to the sphere of
immigration enforcement. The susceptibility of certain noncitizens to
banishment in the form of deportation is mirrored by the exposure of
other liminal populations to banishment in the form of spatial exclusion
and susceptibility to incarceration. In both instances, the criminal justice
system operates in tandem with civil systems of law to effectuate the
expulsion of individuals deemed undesirable. Federal, state and local
agents empowered to enforce the criminal law use fluid and mutually
reinforcing civil and criminal law mechanisms to manage the movement
of particular groups of citizens and noncitizens. Private actors also in-
crease the reach of the state and further the punitive consequences of
official decision-making. Focusing on regulated populations that experi-
ence liminal legality can therefore provide a fruitful analytical starting
point for evaluating the causes and consequences of a broad array of con-
temporary governance strategies.
This Article uses the existing literature on liminal legal subjects as a
starting point for developing an understanding of the legal mechanisms
that produce liminal legality. This analysis highlights commonalities in
governances strategies that affect liminal legal subjects across a range of
formal immigration and citizenship statuses. Part I explores the taxonom-
ical features of liminal legality, as evinced in studies focusing on the life
experiences of marginalized noncitizens. Cecilia Menjivar's study of
Salvadoran and Guatemalan immigrant communities in the United States
provides a starting point for this analysis. The analysis then proceeds to a
discussion of the term as applied to noncitizens eligible for deferred-
action status under the broad executive relief programs announced by
President Obama in 2012 and 2014. These cases-core cases of liminal
legality-suggest some taxonomical features of liminal legality, includ-
ing uncertainty about the scope of reprieve from banishment, a reliance
on administrative grace to effectuate freedom from banishment, an obli-
gation to pay one's way to prevent that banishment, experiences of
heightened monitoring by governmental actors, and a related vulnerabil-
ity to regulation, exclusion, and abuse by private actors.
Part II will explore the possibility of expanding notions of liminal
legality to apply outside of the iconic cases. Section A looks to broader
trends in immigration law to suggest that immigration policy as a
whole-and not just immigration policy as experienced by immigrants
2015] 711
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periodically eligible for temporary authorization-has reoriented itself to
favor the creation of liminal legal states rather than offering expanded
access to more fully incorporative legal statuses. Consequently, even
individuals with lawful immigration status experience liminal legality.
Neither lawful permanent resident status nor various forms of temporary
legal status or legal presence offer protection from this experience of
liminality. As Section B explains, however, the problem is even broader,
insofar as citizens also experience these instabilities. As the criminal and
civil immigration law systems provide mutually reinforcing backstops
that allow for the continual sorting and expulsion of undesirable nonciti-
zens, entire communities experience liminal legality, regardless of the
citizenship status of individual members. Section C takes the analysis a
step further, transporting the notion of liminal legality outside of the im-
migration sphere entirely. Section C explores the ways that criminal law
interacts with other civil law systems to form complex, interlocking sys-
tems of legal regulations and practices that leave many marginalized
denizens vulnerable to banishment. Liminal legality is thus not uniquely
the domain of particular noncitizens, or even of immigrant communities.
Core features of the experience are common across some groups of citi-
zens and noncitizens. These commonalities illustrate the degree to which
legal rights and benefits often hinge less on formal citizenship than exist-
ing analytical frameworks might suggest. This discussion further sug-
gests that problems that he "crimmigration" framework might tempt us
to view as limited to noncitizens are, in fact, pervasive in marginalized
communities, regardless of formal immigration or citizenship status.
Moreover, the purported turn away from severity in both the criminal and
immigration law spheres promises to expand rather than contract the
categories of individuals whose status might be characterized as legally
liminal.
Part III identifies some of the potential discursive and practical ben-
efits of using the concept of liminal legality to reframe discussions con-
cerning certain contemporary trends in governance, particularly around
questions of regulation and policing. First, this framing might allow for
the development of richer and more nuanced accounts about the govem-
ance strategies involved in the creation and management of liminal legal
subjects. Second, a more concretely conceptualized notion of liminal
legality might serve as a focal point that can bring inward-looking dis-
cussions concerning immigration regulation, criminal justice, and other
fields into more meaningful conversation with one another, incorporating
the experiences of noncitizens into the fabric of criminal justice reform
discussions and pushing the academic and social discourse surrounding
noncitizens beyond the constrictive and potentially stigmatizing borders
of "crimmigration." Finally, and more tentatively, I suggest that a focus
on the concept of liminal legality might also offer the basis for a theoret-
ically coherent account of the rise of reform advocacy efforts that deem-
phasize formal egal citizenship as the focal point of rights discourse.
712 [Vol. 92:4
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I. LIMINAL LEGALITY
The notion of liminality in society emerged in anthropological anal-
ysis of communal social rituals offered by Victor Turner in the mid-
century. The related concept of liminal legality was introduced by soci-
ologists much more recently in work focused on certain immigrant com-
2munities in the United States. Although this concept of liminal legality
has gained a foothold in sociological studies of immigrant communities,
scholars in the legal academy have not made much use of it, while schol-
ars outside of the legal academy have used it in ways that suggest differ-
ing understandings of how the concept lines up against formal immigra-
tion and citizenship status.
The term, particularly in its present incarnation, offers a useful
framework in which to situate and analyze legal developments affecting
the millions of longtime denizens of the United States. This is true in the
case of unauthorized migrants, certainly, but also in the cases of many
others, including millions of formal legal citizens who face legal barriers
1. See infra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
2. Cecilia Menjivar, Liminal Legality: Salvadoran and Guatemalan Immigrants' Lives in the
United States, Ill AM. J. Soc. 999, 999-1003 (2006); see also infra notes 6-9 and accompanying
text. Anthropologist Leo R. Chavez has also used Turner's notion of liminality to describe undocu-
mented immigrants in their crossing of the border. Leo R. Chavez, Outside the Imagined Communi-
ty: Undocumented Settlers and Experiences of Incorporation, 18 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 257, 257-60
(1991). Menjivar's conceptualization is self-consciously more extensive. See Menjivar, supra, at
1007 n.8. Susan Bibler Coutin's related notion of "legal nonexistence" served as a precursor and
central building block for Menjivar's "liminal legality." See Menjivar, supra, at 1007-08. Coutin
describes "spaces of nonexistence" in this way:
[E]xistence itself has multiple dimensions. Individuals who are physically present and so-
cially active in the United States can nonetheless lack legal status in this country. Con-
versely, individuals who are legally present in El Salvador and who have Salvadoran citi-
zenship can be persecuted in ways that negate both their citizenship and their humanity. I
refer to the domains occupied by such legal nonsubjects as spaces of nonexistence. Indi-
viduals enter such spaces not only when they cross international borders without authori-
zation but also when they are involved in clandestine activities, when they are abducted
and secretly assassinated by death squads, and when they hide to avoid being captured
and tortured. Nonexistence, like existence, therefore takes multiple forms . . . . Nonexist-
ence, however, is often incomplete . . .. In fact, there are multiple nonexistences and gra-
dations of existence.
SUSAN BIBLER COUTIN, LEGALIZING MOVES: SALVADORAN IMMIGRANTS' STRUGGLE FOR U.S.
RESIDENCY 27 (2000). Coutin's notion of nonexistence as a state that exists in degrees, and her
sense that it can obtain even when an individual is in her native land, are important insights that
foreshadow the discussion of liminal legality herein.
3. For recent work using the term, see, for example, Leisy Abrego & Sarah M. Lakhani,
Incomplete Inclusion: Legal Violence and Immigrants in Liminal Legal Statuses, 37 L. & POL'Y 265,
266 (2015); Leisy J. Abrego & Cecilia Menjivar, Immigrant Latina Mothers as Targets of Legal
Violence, 37 INT'L J. Soc. FAM. 9, 12-14 (2011); Leisy Abrego, Legitimacy, Social Identity, and the
Mobilization of Law: The Effects of Assembly Bill 540 on Undocumented Students in California, 33
L. & Soc. INQUIRY 709, 714-15 (2008); Susan Bibler Coutin et al., Routine Exceptionality: The
Plenary Power Doctrine, Immigrants, and the Indigenous Under U.S. Law, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
97, 100, 115-16 (2014); Miranda Cady Hallett, Temporary Protection, Enduring Contradiction: The
Contested and Contradictory Meanings of Temporary Immigration Status, 39 L. & Soc. INQUIRY
621, 621-26, 629, 635 (2014); Cecilia Menjivar & Susan Bibler Coutin, Challenges of Recognition,
Participation, and Representation for the Legally Liminal: A Comment, in MIGRATION, GENDER
AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN INSECURITY 325, 325-29 (Thanh-Dam Truong et
al. eds., 2014); Menjivar, supra note 2, at 999-1002.
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to gaining or regaining full citizenship4 and who have only limited legal
protections from intrusive and harsh forms of governmental and private
monitoring, policing, detention, and punishment, including banishment.5
4. Citizenship has many meanings, of course. Although much of the literature on liminal
legal status focuses on those who lack permanent formal legal status, this work acknowledges the
complexity of citizenship and effectively maps the ways in which liminal legal subjects can perform
as citizens. See, e.g., Abrego, supra note 3, at 714-15.
In his influential 1950 essay on the topic of citizenship, T.H. Marshall identified three
different forms of citizenship, which he treated as linear and progressive: citizenship with regard to
civil rights, citizenship with regard to political rights, and citizenship with regard to social rights. T.
H. MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS AND OTHER ESSAYS 10-14 (1950). More recently,
Linda Bosniak articulated a four-part typology: citizenship as formal legal status, citizenship as the
enjoyment of a particular bundle of rights and benefits, citizenship as political participation, and
citizenship as social and identity membership. LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN:
DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 18-20 (2006). Bosniak uses her typology to demon-
strate the existence and social importance of the seemingly paradoxical "alien citizen" in the United
States. Id. at 81-82. It is fairly easy to identify many formal legal citizens who lack some of the
rights of full "citizenship" offered in either account. Id. at 37-40, 90-91. Like Bosniak, Luis
Plascencia identifies different forms of citizenship. He theorizes that the terms "[c]itizen" and "citi-
zenship" can be understood as terms divided into "three discursive fields: juridical uses, sociopoliti-
cal uses, and everyday uses." Luls F.B. PLASCENCIA, DISENCHANTING CITIZENSHIP: MEXICAN
MIGRANTS AND THE BOUNDARIES OF BELONGING 5 (2012). But he issues the important cautionary
reminder that these discursive fields are permeable. See id. They impact one another and are mutual-
ly constitutive. The fluidity within and among these discursive fields gives citizenship a certain
openness that is less evident in Marshall and Bosniak's accounts. Plascencia "suggest[s] that part of
the power of the concept of citizenship can be attributed to its lack of cloture. Its very openness
allows the state, interest groups, and individual actors to ground their actions on behalf of citizen-
ship-a citizenship that is differentially defined and generates its historical variability." Id. In this
way, citizenship is salient and elusive. It matters, but its meaning is always up for grabs. I
acknowledge the salience of formal legal distinctions created by citizenship laws, but here, I also
suggest that the discursive openness identified in Plascencia's work is vividly apparent in the legal
liminality experienced by many citizens.
5. Banishment has no formal statutory definition and is not used as a term of art in immigra-
tion law. I use it here because I think it effectively captures what is happening when denizens are
removed from their social and political communities. As a formal legal matter, "removal," which
encompasses both deportation and exclusion, is not punishment. As such, it has been distinguished
from banishment. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) ("The order of
deportation is not a punishment for crime. It is not a banishment . . . . It is but a method of enforcing
the return to his own country of an alien who has not complied with the conditions upon the perfor-
mance of which the government of the nation, acting within its constitutional authority, and through
the proper departments, has determined that his continuing to reside here shall depend."). At times,
various members of the Court have described deportation as a banishment, however, and have
acknowledged its punitive nature. See, e.g., Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 132 (1967) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) ("Deportation is the equivalent to banishment or exile. Though technically not criminal,
it practically may be. The penalty is so severe that we have extended to the resident alien the protec-
tion of due process." (citations omitted)). Quite recently, the Court acknowledged for the first time
the punitive nature of deportation in a doctrinally significant way (albeit while continuing to classify
deportation as a corrective civil remedy). Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 357 (2010). For many
reasons, the archaic classification of deportation as a corrective civil measure no longer squares with
legal reality, if it ever did. See, e.g., DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 92, 121-22, 125-26, 158 (2007) (noting that in the early twentieth century, the
statute of limitations on deportation was eliminated and deportation increasingly came to be used as
a form of punitive "post-entry social control" rather than a mere adjunct to the administrative entry
screening process). Thus, "banishment," although not a legal term of art, more adequately captures
the punitive nature of return experienced by liminally legal populations and is unconstrained by
technical distinctions between "admitted" noncitizens and "inadmissible" (but physically present)
noncitizens. The term also appropriately signals the punitive design and purpose of the act of ban-
ishment. As I argue below, it also correctly signals the parallel functions served by immigration law,
which operates in tandem with the criminal law to banish noncitizens from the legal borders of the
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These individuals may, over time, gain full legal and political citizenship
and concomitant social protections, but they do not have it now, and law
reform efforts do not portend a near-term shift in that direction. The
shared liminal legality of so many at this particular historic juncture is
worthy of exploration. To begin such an exploration, this Part first pro-
vides an overview of prior uses of the term in the academic literature and
then suggests some defining features of liminal legality.
A. Scholarly Origins
Contemporary notions of liminal legality first appeared in the schol-
arship of Cecilia Menjivar, in her work focusing on Salvadoran and Gua-
temalan immigrants in the United States.6 Building on Susan Coutin's
notion of the "spaces of nonexistence" inhabited by legally marginalized
members of these immigrant communities, Menjivar catalogued the myr-
iad ways that the legal regime governing the status of immigrants in the-
se communities functioned to limit, structure, and transform not only
their social interactions but also their perceptions of themselves and their
modes of artistic expression.
The particular communities that she studied presented ample oppor-
tunities for exploring these questions. In the United States, many citizens
of El Salvador and Guatemala have moved in and out of lawful status
over time.8 Sometimes they have a status that offers them significant
protections from removal, sometimes not. Menjivar noted that many
people in these communities have lived in the United States for years, or
even decades, without access to the same rights of individuals lawfully
present on nonimmigrant or immigrant visas.9 She labeled the legally
uncertain space occupied by these noncitizens liminal legality.'o
Notably, Menjivar posits the liminal legality of these individuals,
not because they have a temporarily lawful status (although many of
them do at various points in time), but because they and the members of
their families and communities move in and out of status, between tenta-
country, and the civil regulatory regimes that operate in tandem with the criminal justice system to
banish "undesirables" from the boundaries of the community. See infra at Part II.C.
6. Menjivar, supra note 2, at 1000.
7. Id. at 999-1001.
8. Id. at 1000-01; see also Susan Bibler Coutin, Place and Presence within Salvadoran
Deportees' Narratives of Removal, 20 CHILDHOOD 323, 323-25, 327 (2013); Susan Bibler Coutin,
Falling Outside: Excavating the History of Central American Asylum Seekers, 36 L. & Soc.
INQUIRY 569, 570 (2011).
9. Menjivar, supra note 2, at 1012-16.
10. Id. at 1000 ("Examinations of the effects of legal status on different spheres of life have
concentrated on the differences between documented and undocumented status. I focus on the gray
area between these legal categories, how this 'in-between' status or liminal legality shapes different
spheres of life-the immigrant's immediate sphere of social networks and family, the community-
level place of religious institutions in the immigrants' lives, and the broader domain of artistic ex-
pression."). For another recent discussion of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) recipients in a legal-
ly liminal state see Hallett, supra note 3, at 622.
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tive lawfulness and more complete marginalization.i" In other words,
liminal legality captures the entire in-between existence of moving in and
out of protective states of administrative grace.
Menjivar's conception of liminality draws on the work of anthro-
pologist Victor Turner, who, in his classic work on ritual, identified the
liminal individual as one who is "structurally . . . 'invisible"' because she
is "at once no longer classified and not yet classified."'2 In his chapter on
"Liminality and Communitas," Turner defines liminal individuals as
"neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between the positions as-
signed and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and ceremon[y]."
Turner, for his part, had drawn on the work of Arnold van Gennep, who
had conceptualized the liminal state as the second in a three-part stage in
social rituals.14
In these classic formulations, liminality is an ambiguous, but not
always an undesirable, metaphysical space. It is also a predictable one.
To be liminal is to be outside of, but preparing to reenter, society. For
van Gennep, Turner, and, to a certain extent, the sociologists who later
adapted their work, liminality is not a space of permanent exclusion or a
full marginalization, but rather, a temporary and potentially productive
phase.'5 The present discussion accepts the premise that liminality is not
inherently problematic, but emerging forms of liminal legality raise prob-
lems that are not inherent in classic notions of liminality.
Contemporary liminal legality is characterized first and foremost by
its inherent legal uncertainty. Individuals' legal assurances against full
marginalization lack definitive temporal scope and are generally extend-
ed as privileges, not rights.'6 The inherent fragility and the indefinite
nature of the period(s) of administrative grace create instability in many
aspects of the lives of liminal legal subjects. As Menjivar observes in the
lives of the Salvadoran and Guatemalan immigrants that are the subject
of her study, the need to constantly reapply for, and meet the require-
ments of, the protected statuses that they may be eligible to access:
[C]reates enormous anxiety, as each deadline accentuates these im-
migrants' precarious situation, which for many has gone on for over
two decades....
11. See Menjivar, supra note 2, at 1016.
12. VICTOR TURNER, THE FOREST OF SYMBOLS: ASPECTS OF NDEMBU RITUAL 95-96 (1967).
13. VICTOR W. TURNER, THE RITUAL PROCESS: STRUCTURE AND ANTI-STRUCTURE 95
(1969).
14. ARNOLD VAN GENNEP, THE RITES OF PASSAGE 10-11 (1960). Van Gennep argued that
social rituals involve passage through a period of separation, a liminal period, and a period of reas-
similation. Id.
15. See, e.g., id at I1. Perhaps there is an (undue?) optimism in using the label of liminality
rather than marginalization to describe some the legal subjects discussed in this Article.
16. See Menjivar, supra note 2, at 1000-01.
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. . . This uncertain status . . . permeates many aspects of the immi-
grants' lives and delimits their range of action in different spheres,
from job market opportunities and housing, to family and kinship,
from the place of the church in their lives and their various transna-
tional activities, to artistic expressions.17
But the temporal and legal instability of their freedom from ban-
ishment at the hands of the state is not the only feature of liminal legali-
ty. Although Menjivar does not attempt to identify all of the features of
liminal legality or to offer a comprehensive theory of what that transi-
tional state might entail, certain key features emerge in her account and
in the work of others who have studied the lives of people in communi-
ties with high concentrations of liminal legal subjects. 18 Reviewing her
work, the work of other scholars contributing to and building on this
concept, and the lived experience of the individuals categorized in previ-
ous scholarship as legally liminal, one can identify several notable fea-
tures of liminal legality.
First, these populations are often obliged to pay their way to access
statuses that formally stave off banishment. The temporary protected
statuses to which the individuals in Menjivar's study might have access
come at a price.19 Second, these individuals are subject to heightened
monitoring by governmental actors.20 The eligibility requirements in-
clude the ability to document presence and residence, and the absence of
disqualifying criminal or associational conduct.21 Each time the applicant
re-applies, this documentation is required, and a failure to reapply in a
timely fashion is itself a disqualifying factor.22
The heightened governmental monitoring of this population also
renders individuals with liminal legal status particularly vulnerable to the
discretionary decision-making of public and private actors. The eligibil-
ity criteria for certain qualifying temporary statuses impose stringent
requirements that do not apply to those with more stable forms of imni-
17. Id. at 1000-01.
18. See sources cited supra note 3.
19. The application fee for Temporary Protected Status, the form of immigration relief that
many of the individuals studied by Menjivar are able to access, is currently $85, plus an additional
$380 for employment authorization. See Temporary Protected Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status-deferred-enforced-
departure/temporary-protected-status (last updated Sept. 3, 2015). Of course, not all noncitizens pay
for status. Some experience a favorable exercise of discretion in the form of a closed case or a deci-
sion by USCIS not to initiate removal proceedings. In such cases, there is no formal price tag af-
fixed to freedom from banishment. But even for many of these noncitizens, the lack of secure legal
status generate costs in the form of depressed wages and lost eaming opportunities. See infra note 73
(discussing the fiscal impact of undocumented immigration status) and note 223 (discussing wage
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gration status,23 which means that individuals' right to remain is tied
more closely to discretionary law enforcement decisions about where to
allocate policing resources and how to process low-level crimes and in-
fractions. At the same time, the same individuals are also more exposed
to exploitation, abuse, and manipulation by other private actors. Those
out of status are particularly vulnerable to workplace exploitation, nega-
tive wage effects, and private discrimination,2 4 but neither provisional
legal statuses nor citizenship consistently offer a shield from such exploi-
tation.25
B. Identifying Key Features: The Iconic Case
In Menjivar's work, noncitizens in Salvadoran and Guatemalan
communities in the United States, existing on the edge of banishment but
situated in communities that sometimes (and variably) have access to
various forms of formal legal status, constitute the relevant group of lim-
inal legal subjects.26 As a legal matter, the subjects of her study are di-
rectly analogous to a new and more expansive group of liminal legal
subjects: communities of noncitizens potentially eligible for relief under
the broad executive relief programs announced by the Obama Admin-
istration in June 2012 and November 2014. Some scholars have already
described these communities as legally liminal.27 This population, which
is still squarely in the territory of iconic liminal legality, provides a use-
ful focal point for amplifying the discussion of the features of liminal
legal status preliminarily mapped out in Section A. Liminal legal status is
not limited to this group of noncitizens or even to communities that in-
clude noncitizens more generally. But identifying key elements of limi-
nal legality in this context is a useful step toward understanding how
liminality is produced by law.
Several recent executive actions offer certain noncitizens temporary
deportation relief without legal status. On June 15, 2012, Janet Napoli-
23. Compare id. (outlining the bars to TPS), with Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) §
237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2015) (providing the less extensive exclusion and deportation provisions of
the INA).
24. Menjivar, supra note 2, at 1009; see also JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS:
THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 10-66 (2005) (discussing and providing examples of challenges
faced by immigrant workers in the workplace); Josiah McC. Heyman, State Effects on Labor Exploi-
tation: The INS and Undocumented Immigrants at the Mexico-United States Border, 18 CRITIQUE
ANTHROPOLOGY 157, 157 (1998); Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the Workplace,
61 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1107 (2009); Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthor-
ized Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 195 (2007).
25. See, e.g., Abrego & Lakhani, supra note 3, at 274-75 (discussing the social and legal
vulnerabilities of various groups of noncitizens lawfully present); David Bacon, Be Our Guests,
NATION (Sept. 9, 2004), http://www.thenation.com/article/be-our-guests (discussing the vulnerabili-
ties of noncitizens present on H2-A visas).
26. See Menjivar, supra note 2, at 999-1000.
27. See, e.g., Ryan Anderson, Legality, Race, and Inequality: An Interview with Ruth Gom-
berg-Mulioz (Part II), SAVAGE MINDS (Feb. 5, 2015), http://savageminds.org/2015/02/05/legality-
race-and-inequality-an-interview-with-ruth-gomberg-munoz-part-ii/ (referring to DACA recipients
as being held in a state of "liminal legality" with express reference to Menjivar's work).
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tano announced the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA) pro-
gram.28 Noncitizens who were under thirty-one on the date of the an-
nouncement, who had entered the United States before June 15, 2007, as
children under the age of sixteen, who had completed high school, and
who did not have disqualifying criminal records were eligible for de-
ferred action.29 A significant population moved out of the shadows3 0 and
into a new space of liminal legality. About 600,000 individuals moved
from being undocumented to being "DACAmented"3  over the next two
32years. DACA recipients obtained their access to this new legal space
largely through their own political exertions. In so doing, they demon-
strated levels of belonging, political participation, and social influence
that are often thought to be limited to formal legal citizens.33 They were
able to capitalize on the protected space that Plyler v. Doe,34 and later,
legislation like California's in-state tuition bill, A.B. 540," had created
for them. In this way, it is important to note that DACA recipients were
really already liminal legal subjects before DACA was created. They had
a quasi-protected status in schools and were low priorities for removal
even before DACA created a new and somewhat more stable, but still
liminal, legal status that they were able to access.
Continued advocacy by DACA recipients and their allies eventually
succeeded in pressuring the administration to generate a plan to expand
executive relief. On November 20, 2014, Department of Homeland Secu-
28. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. to David V.
Aguilar, Acting Comm'r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. Citizenship
& Immigration Servs. & John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enft 1 (June 15, 2012)
[hereinafter Napolitano Memorandum], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/sl-
exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf.
29. Id.
30. As Geoffrey Heeren notes, "'[C]oming out of the shadows' is how immigrant advocates
and Dreamers often characterize obtaining nonstatus. It is a way to claim some measure of dignity in
a society that stigmatizes those without status as 'illegals."' Geoffrey Heeren, The Status of Nonsta-
tus,64AM.U.L.REV. 1115, 1132(2015).
31. The term DACA-mented is increasingly commonly used to distinguish deferred action
recipients from populations with more formal legal immigration status. See, e.g., TOM K. WONG ET
AL., UNDOCUMENTED NO MORE: A NATIONWIDE ANALYSIS OF DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD
ARRIVALS, OR DACA, at 2 (2013), available at https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/DACAReportCC-2- I.pdf.
32. Press Release, Migration Policy Inst., MPI: As Many as 3.7 Million Unauthorized Immi-
grants Could Get Relief from Deportation Under Anticipated New Deferred Action Program (Nov.
19, 2014), available at http://migrationpolicy.org/news/mpi-many-37-million-unauthorized-
immigrants-could-get-relief-deportation-under-anticipated-new (noting that, as of the date of the
report, 580,000 individuals had received relief under the program); see also WONG ET AL., supra
note 31, at I (providing survey information regarding the impact of the program on recipients).
33. Linda Bosniak's notion of alien citizenship seems apt here. See BOSNIAK, supra note 4, at
81-82.
34. 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (striking down a Texas statute requiring unauthorized immigration
children to pay for or be denied public education from kindergarten through twelfth grade).
35. Act of Oct. 13, 2001, ch. 814, 2001 Cal. Legis. Serv. § 2 (West) (codified at CAL. EDUC.
CODE § 68130.5 (West 2015)). A.B. 540 is the law that extended in-state tuition benefits to unau-
thorized immigrants attending California's public institutions of higher learning. Id. For a discussion
of the role the bill played in the political mobilization of undocumented youth, see Abrego, supra
note 3, at 727-29.
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rity Secretary Jeh Johnson issued a memorandum that could change sig-
nificantly the lives of millions of people living within the borders of the
United States,36 including many individuals who were more marginalized
than the original DACA recipients. Like Secretary Napolitano before
him, Secretary Johnson addressed this memorandum, "intended to reflect
new policies for the use of deferred action," to the Director of U.S. Citi-
zenship and Immigration Services, the Acting Director of U.S. Immigra-
tion and Customs Enforcement, and the Commissioner of U.S. Customs
and Border Protection. 3 The memo offers guidance to these agencies as
to appropriate uses of deferred action. The memo defines deferred action
in this way:
Deferred action is a form of prosecutorial discretion by which the
Secretary deprioritizes an individual's case for humanitarian reasons,
administrative convenience, or in the interest of the Department's
overall enforcement mission. As an act of prosecutorial discretion,
deferred action is legally available so long as it is granted on a case-
by-case basis, and it may be terminated at any time at the agency's
discretion. Deferred action does not confer any form of legal status in
this country, much less citizenship; it simply means that, for a speci-
fied period of time, an individual is permitted to be lawfully present
in the United States. Nor can deferred action itself lead to a green
card. Although deferred action is not expressly conferred by statute,
the practice is referenced and therefore endorsed by implication in
several federal statutes.38
Several large classes of noncitizens would be eligible for deferred
action pursuant to the terms of the November memorandum.39 These
include individuals previously eligible for DACA. 40 The memo extends
their initial grant of deferred action.41 But it also includes individuals
eligible for an expanded DACA (DACA+), as well as those who fall into
a category that was first called Deferred Action for Parental Accountabil-
ity, and now bears the title of Deferred Action for Parents of Americans
and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA). 42
In defining the category of noncitizens eligible for DACA+, the
Johnson memo removed the age cap for "otherwise eligible immigrants
who entered the United States by the requisite adjusted entry date [now
January 1, 2010, rather than June 15, 2007] before the age of sixteen
36. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. to Le6n
Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, R. Gil Kerlikowske, Comm'r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. I
(Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Johnson Memorandum], available at http://www.aila.org/infonet/dhs-
exercising-prosecutorial-discretion.
37. Id. at 1.
38. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
39. See id. at 3.
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(16), regardless of how old they were in June 2012 or are today."43
DAPA applies to individuals with children who are U.S. citizens or law-
ful permanent residents, provided those individuals "have continuously
resided in the United States since before January 1, 2010," are physically
present on the memo date, and when applying, "have no lawful status,"
"are not an enforcement priority" as identified in a separate memo issued
the same day, and "present no other factors that, in the exercise of discre-
tion, makes the grant of deferred action inappropriate."" Notably, DAPA
does not extend to the parents of DACA recipients who lack qualifying
relationships to citizens or Legal Permanent Residents (LPRs).45
By some estimates, the number of DACA+ or DAPA-eligible
noncitizens is approximately five million. 4 6  Qualifying noncitizens
would be eligible not only for deferred removal but also for work author-
ization4 7 and drivers licenses.4 8 The fee for this relief would be $465, and
"[tlhere will be no fee waivers and, like DACA, very limited fee exemp-
tions."49 Interestingly, there are a significant number of minor variations
in the DACA and DAPA eligibility criteria, particularly with regard to
43. Id. at 3-4.
44. Id at 4.
45. The Office of Legal Counsel memorandum providing the legal rationale for the DACA
and DAPA programs posits that such relief would exceed the scope of executive power. See The
Dep't of Homeland Sec.'s Auth. to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the
U.S. & to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op. O.L.C. 2 (2014) [hereinafter OLC Memorandum],
available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/attachments/2014/11/20/2014-1I-
19-auth-prioritize-removal.pdf. For a critique of this reasoning as internally inconsistent with the
OLC's own rationale in support of the other relief provisions, see, for example, Immigration Law-
Office of Legal Counsel Issues Opinion Endorsing President Obama s Executive Order on Deferred
Action for Parental Accountability-The Department of Homeland Security's Authority to Prioritize
Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others,
38 OP. O.L.C. (Nov. 19, 2014), 128 HARV. L. REV. 2320, 2325 (2015).
46. See, e.g., Office of the Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet: Immigration Accountability Executive
Action, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/11/20/fact-sheet-immigration-accountability-executive-action; see also Press Release,
Migration Policy Inst., supra note 32 ("MPI estimates the anticipated new deferred action program
and expanded DACA initiative could benefit as many as 5.2 million people-nearly half of the 11.4
million unauthorized immigrants living in the United States . . . .").
47. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 274A(h)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3) (2015).
48. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and
Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 202(c)(2)(B)(viii), 119 Stat. 231, 313 (2005). Several states
have challenged the driver's license provision in court, but to date, those challenges have been
unsuccessful in preventing the issuance of drivers licenses to DACA recipients. THE PEW
CHARITABLE TRUSTS, DECIDING WHO DRIVES: STATE CHOICES SURROUNDING UNAUTHORIZED
IMMIGRANTS AND DRIVER'S LICENSES 8-9 (2015), available at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/Assets/2015/08/Deciding-Who-Drives.pdf.
49. Johnson Memorandum, supra note 36, at 5. In the DACA context, private organizations
have engaged in fundraising efforts to assist in covering the application expenses for otherwise-
qualified DACA applicants. See Jana Kasperkevic, The High Cost ofBeing a Legal Immigrant in the
US: $465, GUARDIAN (Jan. 8, 2014, 8:01 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/money/2014/jan/08/undocumented-dreamers-immigration-daca-cost-
fee.
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the kinds of criminal conduct and criminal records that will bar relief in
each of these categories., and the DAPA criteria is stricter.50
The proposed DACA and DAPA programs are not the first efforts
by the Executive Branch to provide relief to noncitizens who might oth-
erwise be removed from the United States. Indeed, the Office of Legal
Counsel memorandum outlining the legal basis for the DACA+ and
DAPA programs5 ' notes the long history of executive relief in the immi-
gration context, including some statutorily designated forms of discre-
tionary, temporary relief such as parole-in-place (PIP),5 2 Temporary Pro-
tected Status (TPS), 53 and some non-statutorily based recurring forms of
executive relief such as Deferred Enforced Departure (DED). 5 4 Tempo-
rary Protected Status was, of course, of central importance to the com-
munities studied in Menjivar's account of liminal legality.55 The new
DACA recipients as well as the intended DAPA and DACA+ recipients
thus fit neatly under the same legal rubric that framed prior accounts of
liminal legality.
One important commonality between PIP, DED, TPS, DACA, and
DAPA is that they are all temporary forms of relief that offer no formal
legal immigration status, much less a path to citizenship. Like the TPS
recipients studied by Menjivar, DACA (and eventually, perhaps, DAPA
and DACA+) recipients receive a grant of protection that is time-
limited.6 As with TPS recipients, DACA recipients have to wait until
50. See, e.g., Immigrant Legal Res. Ctr. & Nat'l Immigration Project of the Nat'1 Lawyers
Guild, Key Differences Between the DACA and DAPA Criminal and Enforcement-Related Bars,
MYGIDEON,
http://www.mygideon.org/@api/deki/files/68243/CriminalBarstoDAPA_Handout.pdf (last
updated Jan. 27, 2015).
51. See OLC Memorandum, supra note 45, at 5, 12.
52. 8 U.S.C. § I 182(d)(5)(A) (temporary lawful presence available to noncitizens "for urgent
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.").
53. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a). TPS is a statutory grant that appears to replace a prior form of non-
statutory executive relief known as extended voluntary departure. TPS is a form of temporary relief
available to noncitizens whose home countries are suffering from "ongoing armed conflict," the fall-
out of environmental disasters like earthquakes and hurricanes, and other such conditions. Id.
§ 1254(b)(1). The application forms for DACA relief bear a good deal of resemblance to the TPS
forms, although they also departed from these forms in ways that made it possible for DACA appli-
cants to reveal less personal information than would have been required for a grant of TPS-
presumably because DACA recipients were understandably concerned about providing information
that might reveal the whereabouts of family members ineligible for the program. Compare USCIS
Form 1-821 (TPS application form) with USCIS 1-821D (DACA application form).
54. OLC Memorandum, supra note 45, at 12 n.5. Deferred enforced departure (DED) "has no
statutory basis," but is described in the USCIS, Adjudicator's Field Manual. Id. (quoting U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., ADJUDICATOR'S FIELD MANUAL § 38.2(a) (2014)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). DED may be granted to nationals of appropriate foreign states and is
justified as an exercise of "the President's constitutional powers to conduct foreign relations." Id.
(quoting U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., ADJUDICATOR'S FIELD MANUAL § 38.2(a)
(2014)) (internal quotation marks omitted). By way of example, it was granted to some Guatemalans
and Salvadorans at the time that their 1990 grant of TPS status expired. Menjivar, supra note 2, at
1016. Their DED status expired in 1995. Id.
55. See Menjivar, supra note 2, at 1016.
56. See Johnson Memorandum, supra note 36, at 3.
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very near the expiration date of their temporary protections to determine
whether the Executive Branch plans to extend that date.57 Only then do
they have the opportunity to reapply.5 8 Nor does the uncertainty end with
renewal applications. In the Spring of 2015, over 11,000 DACA recipi-
ents who filed timely renewals actually experienced a temporary lapse in
status, and the related problems of temporary unemployment and even
job loss, because of processing delays.59
The temporal uncertainty of core legal protections stands at the cen-
ter of the experience of liminal legality.60 It is not the formal legal re-
prieve-be it TPS, DED, or DACA-that defined liminal legality. It is
the existence on the edges of such relief, which sometimes comes into
existence and sometimes does not. The temporal limits on available relief
actually present potential recipients with valid questions about whether it
is worth it to apply; many people eligible for relief like DACA indeed
have not applied.6 ' These non-applicants also exist in spaces of liminal
legality, however. They are potentially eligible for temporary forms of
deportation relief, but they do not have it. At the same time, their pre-
sumptive eligibility may offer them certain protections even in the ab-
sence of a grant of DACA because they are low enforcement priorities
with long-term ties to the United States.62 The fact that one need not ac-
57. USCIS made the first renewal forms for DACA available in June 2014, which was only a
few months before initial grants of DACA began to expire. See Patrick Taurel, The DACA Renewal
Process: Everything You Need to Know, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL: IMMIGRATION IMPACT
(June 5, 2014), http://immigrationimpact.com/2014/06/05/the-daca-renewal-process-everything-
you-need-to-know/ ("Today, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) announced the
renewal process for hundreds of thousands of young noncitizens who received a grant of Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). . . . The renewal announcement comes not a moment too
soon. Because DACA recipients are encouraged to request renewal between four to five months
ahead of their expiration date to avoid a lapse, the earliest major wave of DACA recipients-who
received their DACA grants in September and October of 2012-will need to act right away.").
58. Cf Menjivar, supra note 2, at 1016; Hallett, supra note 3, at 630.
59. David Noriega, Thousands of Dreamers are Losing Their Work Permits, BUZZFEED
NEWS (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.buzzfeed.com/davidnoriega/thousands-shielded-from-
deportation-losing-work-permits#.rdrVpVKAO.
60. Ruben Andersson has argued that temporality is a tool wielded by states in their efforts to
control unauthorized migration. Ruben Andersson, Time and the Migrant Other: European Border
Controls and the Temporal Economics of Illegality, 116 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 795, 796 (2014).
Making people wait is "an integral part of the exercise of power." Id. at 802 (quoting HANS LUCHT,
DARKNESS BEFORE DAYBREAK: AFRICAN MIGRANTS LIVING ON THE MARGINS IN SOUTHERN ITALY
TODAY 73 (2012) (drawing on the work of Pierre Bourdieu)). See also Susan Bibler Coutin, Being
En Route, 107 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 195, 196 (2005) (discussing illegality as "eras[ing] presence
and suspend[ing] time").
61. Press Release, Migration Policy Inst., supra note 32 ("Fifty-five percent of those who met
the DACA criteria had applied for relief. Application costs, fear of self-identifying as unauthorized
or potentially exposing other unauthorized relatives to government scrutiny and lack of information
about the program and its temporary nature were among the barriers.").
62. The announcement of DACA+ and DAPA was also made in the context of new enforce-
ment priorities. Similar priorities theoretically have been in place for some time. See, e.g., Memo-
randum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement to All Field Office
Dirs., All Special Agents in Charge & All Chief Counsel 1-5 (June 17, 2011), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf (identifying
enforcement priorities); see also Memorandum from William J. Howard, Principal Legal Advisor to
All OPLA Chief Counsel 3-4 (Oct. 24, 2005), available at
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cess formal relief, or even intend to do so, illustrates the important points
that legal liminality is variegated and maps imperfectly onto the catego-
ries of formal legal status.
The uncertainty of liminal legality as experienced by potential bene-
ficiaries of deferred action was highlighted recently when Federal Dis-
trict Court Judge Hanen issued an emergency stay to prevent the rollout
of DACA+ from being implemented on the planned February 18, 2015,
start date.63 Judge Hanen concluded that the state of Texas (which
brought the suit along with twenty-five other states) had standing to chal-
lenge these executive actions, that the court had jurisdiction to hear the
challenge, and that the DACA+ and DAPA programs should be tempo-
rarily enjoined on the grounds that the Obama Administration violated
the notice and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedures
Act in rolling out the programs.4 Judge Hanen's legal reasoning on each
of these questions is debatable.65 However, one judge's ability to grind to
http://shusterman.com/pdf/prosecutorialdiscretionimmigration1005.pdf; Memorandum from Doris




00.pdf/view; Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Sec'y, U.S. Immigration & Customs En-
forcement to All ICE Emps. 1-2 (June 30, 2010), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2010/civil-enforcement-priorities.pdf; Memorandum from
Julie L. Myers, Assistant Sec'y, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement for All Field Office Dirs.
& All Special Agents in Charge 1 (Nov. 7, 2007), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/22092973/ICE-Guidance-Memo-Prosecutorial-Discretion-Julie-Myers-
11-7-07; SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, THE MORTON MEMO AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 3-6
(2011), available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Shoba-
Prosecutorial Discretion_07201 1_0.pdf.
Individuals who are not priorities for deportation are certainly not immune from deportation. See,
e.g., Bill Ong Hing, The Failure ofProsecutorial Discretion and the Deportation ofOscar Martinez,
15 SCHOLAR 437, 439-41 (2013) (discussing the deportation of purportedly low-priority noncitizens
with attention to one particular case).
63. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677-78 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2015).
64. Id. at 114-16, 193-95.
65. Texas's standing is based on the costs of issuing driver's licenses to DACA and DAPA
recipients-a practice that is sanctioned for deferred action recipients by the REAL ID Act of 2005.
Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, tit. 2, § 202, 119 Stat. 231, 312-13 (2005). The DACA and DAPA
program do not create this obligation requirement on the states although each grant of deferred
action triggers it. Even if Texas has standing and a court decides that he question is justiciable, the
APA notice and comment requirements may be inapposite here. The requirement does not apply to
"general statements of policy." 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2015). The Administration argues that the
announced expansion of deferred action is merely a statement of enforcement priorities that cede to
USCIS agents the ability to make individual case determinations in implementation. As such, it
appears to fall comfortably within the exception to notice and comment rulemaking, although such
questions are legally vexing in any administrative context, and certainly no less so in immigration.
See Jill E. Family, Administrative Law Through the Lens of Immigration Law, 64 ADMIN. L. REV.
565, 570-71, 588 (2012); John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 893
(2004). Discretion is a key element that distinguishes a legislative rule from a policy statement.
Family, supra, at. 577-78.
While opponents of the program point to the low number of individuals actually denied
DACA status to support the argument that such discretion does not exist, more than 10% of appli-
cants have been denied DACA. As of February 2015, the government reported that "six percent of
adjudicated DACA requests have been denied, in addition to the six percent that were initially re-
jected when filed." Attachments to Appellants' Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal at 32,
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a halt a process meant to lift the constant threat of expulsion faced by
millions of people in one fell swoop illustrates the extreme contingency
of liminal status.6 6
As this Article goes to press, the Fifth Circuit had recently affirmed
Judge Hanen's order,6 7 and did so in a way that once again illustrates
how widespread liminal legality is among noncitizens in the United
States. The Fifth Circuit agreed that the Obama Administration has the
discretionary authority to decline to deport a subset of unauthorized mi-
grants.68 But the Court found that the Administration exceeded its author-
ity in providing what the Fifth Circuit characterized as the status of "law-
ful presence" to some noncitizens. In the court's view, this status could
not be granted absent notice-and-comment rulemaking.69 To bolster its
characterization of deferred action as a status, the court focused on the
DHS Secretary's planned grant of work authorization to DACA+ and
70DAPA recipients. Yet the authority for providing work authorization
for deferred action recipients stretches back decades, and flows directly
from statutory provisions and notice-and-comment rules.71 The Fifth
Circuit's broad reasoning thus would potentially invalidate the work au-
thorization of thousands of noncitizens-including current DACA recip-
ients and other beneficiaries of humanitarian deferred action status-
who have received work authorization pursuant to the provision that the
Fifth Circuit found unlawful. In this way, the Fifth Circuit's decision
again highlights the legal precariousness experienced by many categories
of noncitizens.
Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-40238). Moreover, some potentially
qualified noncitizens are not applying for relief at all because immigration service providers have
identified elements of their records that could warrant unfavorable exercises of discretion, such as
imputed gang affiliation. See, e.g., Catholic Charities, DACA Pre-Screening Pre-Registration Form,
http://www.catholiccharitiesoregon.org/Pre-Screening%20Intake%2OForm.pdf (last visited Oct. 12,
2015). One widely-used DACA screening form asks potential applicants to reveal whether or not
they "have any tattoos." Id. The fact that organizations bent on optimizing DACA and DAPA en-
rollment are screening out potentially eligible applicants because of concerns about discretionary
denials suggests that there is a real element of enforcement discretion in the administrative screening
of deferred action applicants.
66. Juliet Stumpf and Stephen Manning theorize that the creation of DACA and DAPA, and
other innovations in immigration regulation indeed represent a kind of "liminal law." Stephen Man-
ning & Juliet Stumpf, Rethinking the "Law " in Immigration Law (unpublished preliminary draft) (on
file with the author). Here, I do not argue, as they do, that there are categories of administrative
guidance documents or other administrative and legislative practices that constitute a distinctly
liminal category of law. But my arguments also are not incompatible with their claim.
67. Texas v. United States, No. 15-40238, 2015 WL 6873190, at *1 (5th Cir. Nov. 25, 2015).
The Obama Administration has announced its plan to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court, so
the litigation continues. Michael D. Shear, Obama to Appeal Immigration Ruling to Supreme Court,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/Il/l/us/politics/supreme-court-
immigration-obama.html?_r-0.
68. Texas, 2015 WL 6873190, at *16-18.
69. Id. at *18-19.
70. Id. at *24.
71. Id. at *48-50 (King, J., dissenting).
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Should DACA+ and DAPA ultimately move forward, hundreds of
thousands-perhaps even millions-of DACA and DAPA recipients will
join the ranks of the temporarily sanctioned sojourner. They will move
further from the more marginal spaces occupied by unauthorized mi-
grants who are "enforcement priorities" and further still from the long-
time residents of this country who have already been banished.72 They
will be marked, like existing DACA recipients and TPS recipients past
and present, as a part of the larger world of liminal legal subjects that
scholars like Menjivar have begun to map, and notwithstanding their
access to a non-status protection, they will continue to experience all of
the accompanying instabilities of liminal legality.
They will also experience significant benefits, of course. The tem-
porary legal reprieve that DACA and DAPA offer will bring with it life-
altering improvements for those who have lived in the United States for
years without formal legal authorization. The negative effects of undoc-
umented status are extensively documented. Unsurprisingly, the availa-
ble data suggests that even at this early stage of the program, receiving
DACA has greatly improved the lives of DACA recipients.7 4 DACA-
mented individuals experience a wage bump and better educational out-
comes.75 At the anecdotal level, they also report improvements in their
subjective feelings of security and well-being.76 Thus, it is a space of
some sort of inclusion, with some opportunity for positive transfor-
mations for the individual in their relations with other denizens and the
state.
72. See infra Part Ill.A (discussing recent enforcement trends).
73. See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET AL., BEYOND SMOKE AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN
IMMIGRATION IN AN ERA OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 118-26 (2002) (documenting the negative
effect of undocumented status on wages); Heyman, supra note 24, at 157-58 (documenting the
negative effect of undocumented status on wages).
74. ROBERTO G. GONZALES & VERONICA TERRIQUEZ, How DACA Is IMPACTING THE LIVES
OF THOSE WHO ARE NOw DACAMENTED: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL
UNDACAMENTED RESEARCH PROJECT (2013), available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-
facts/how-daca-impacting-lives-those-who-are-now-dacamented; WONG ET AL., supra note 31, at
10; see also Caitlin Patler & Jorge Cabrera, From Undocumented to DACAmented: Benefits and
Limitations of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) Program, Three Years Following
its Announcement, RES. & POL'Y BRIEFUCLA Inst. for Research on Labor and Emp't, May 2015, at
5, available at http://www.irle.ucla.edu/publications/documents/ResearchBrief27Patler_000.pdf.
75. GONAZALES & TERRIQUEZ, supra note 74; see also WONG ET AL., supra note 31, at 27;
Patler & Cabrera, supra note 74.
76. The Televisa foundation enlisted several DACA recipients to create autobiographical
videos promoting the DACA program to the estimated 500,000 noncitizens who are eligible for
DACA but have not yet applied. Think About It, THINKABOUTIT.US, http://thinkaboutit.us/ (last
visited Apr. 5, 2015).
77. This is consonant with Menjivar's findings, and with the prior uses of the notion of limi-
nality as a social state, that the period of liminality can be a productive state. See supra notes 9-12
and accompanying text.
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Nevertheless, there are social and legal costs to living in a state of
liminal legality.78 Identifying those costs helps to further illustrate some
of the key features of liminal legal status. First, there are the literal costs.
Individuals existing in states of liminal legality have access to a slightly
greater degree of legal protection from expulsion, but they have to pay
for it. Like TPS, the DACA, DACA+, and DAPA programs require (or
would require) recipients to pay recurring fees associated with moving
from an unprotected (but often untargeted) group79 to a group with a
more formal protection from banishment that still falls well short of a
privileged legal status. As previously noted, the fee for DACA is a non-
waivable $495, and it is payable with each application for temporary
relief. For some, this presents a very real obstacle to greater legal stabil-
ity.80 The requirement that individuals threatened with banishment pay a
monetary price for the very basic right to be free from this banishment is
a recurring feature of liminal legality.8'
Second, liminal legal status exposes individuals to both govemmen-
tal caprice and private exploitation. Because of the stringent82 and some-
what ambiguous83 eligibility limitations of the DACA and DAPA pro-
gram, even those who gain this (non)status are more vulnerable than oth-
er long-time lawful residents subject o narrower deportation grounds.
This group of noncitizens is particularly vulnerable to discretionary deci-
sions by law enforcement agents at all levels of government. Decisions
by state and local law enforcement to prioritize immigration-related en-
78. Geoffrey Heeren skillfully illustrates the complex realities of the DACA program. Heeren,
supra note 30, at 1174-77. Heeren argues that the grant of nonstatus paradoxically bestows dignity
and legitimacy on its recipients, even as it orchestrates their heightened surveillance. See id
79. 1 should stress again, of course, that many people who fit the DACA and DAPA profile
have been deported over the years. To suggest that hey are low-priority is not to suggest that they
are immune from deportation. See, e.g., Hing, supra note 62, at 501. Indeed, the very randomness of
their potential selection adds to the stress of liminal existence.
80. Kasperkevic, supra note 49 ("Cost has been one of the top reasons why people eligible for
DACA delay their application, says Sarah Hooker, policy analyst at Migration Policy Institute. The
$465 application fee, while minuscule to most middle-class Americans, has played a large role in
preventing young undocumented immigrants from applying for work permits.").
81. See sources cited supra note 73; cf Menjivar, supra note 2, at 1025-27 (noting the finan-
cial concerns generated by liminal legality).
82. To succeed, the DACA applicant must establish that she has not been "convicted of a
felony, significant misdemeanor, three or more other misdemeanors, and do[es] not otherwise pose a
threat to national security or public safety." Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, U.S.
DEPARTMENT HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/deferred-action-childhood-arrivals (last
published date July 17, 2015). Immigration service providers advise potential applicants that the
criminal bar of three non-significant misdemeanors exclude minor traffic violations, but also caution
that any purported gang activity or participation in criminal activity can serve as a bar to DACA on
public safety grounds, even in the absence of a criminal record. See, e.g., Understanding the Crimi-
nal Bars to the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER,
http://www.ilrc.org/files/documents/ilrc-2012-dacachart I.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2015).
83. Service providers note that the individual's total history is relevant to the determination.
Matters like juvenile and expunged convictions can affect DACA determinations, as can even loose
indicia of gang affiliation. See, e.g., Understanding the Criminal Bars to the Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals, supra note 82.
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forcement efforts carried out under a different name,84 decisions by state
legislatures to criminalize noncitizens through expansive criminal provi-
sions,85 and even the decision to concentrate greater policing resources
for "crime suppression sweeps" in immigrant-dense neighborhoods86 are
particularly problematic for individuals with deferred action status. Be-
cause the eligibility criteria for DACA is more exacting than the deporta-
tion grounds that cover long-time lawful residents,87 DACA recipients
remain quite vulnerable to banishment.
This leaves them more vulnerable to private actors as well. Employ-
ers are one obvious example-they can exploit status vulnerabilities to
suppress wages, discourage organizing, and skirt workplace regulations
for their noncitizen workers.88 But there are other examples. Notably,
noncitizens are heavily reliant on private legal service providers when it
comes to getting their information about potential legal relief. Conse-
quently, private organizations indirectly define eligibility for relief
through the dissemination of eligibility criteria and through their own
screening exercises.89 Moreover, private organizations play a significant
84. See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly, Local Immigration Prosecution: A Study of Arizona Before SB
1070, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1749, 1760-66 (2011) (analyzing Arizona's enforcement of its "self-
smuggling" prohibitions in the period preceding the enactment of S.B. 1070); Hiroshi Motomura,
The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the
Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1847-49 (2011); see also Jennifer M. Chac6n, Ten-
sions and Trade-offs: Protecting Trafficking Victims in the Era of Immigration Enforcement, 158 U.
PA. L. REV. 1609, 1643-45 (2010) (noting that some states enacted anti-trafficking laws in contexts
that suggested their likely primary use as immigration enforcement tools).
85. Federal District Court Judge Susan Bolton recently struck down on preemption grounds
the anti-smuggling provision that was the focus of Ingrid Eagly's study. See United States v. Arizo-
na, No. CV-10-01413-PHX-SRB (D. Ariz. Nov. 7, 2014), available at
http://d35brb9zkkbdsd.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/2014-11-10-
ArizSmugglingRuling.pdf (order on partial judgment on the pleadings). But there are many ways
states can play the immigration enforcement game. To take another example, for several years Mari-
copa County officials used an Arizona provision that criminalizes "identity theft"-even where the
identity is fictitious-for the purpose of prosecuting noncitizens unauthorized to work in the state.
That practice was also recently preliminarily enjoined. Puente Arizona v. Arpaio, 76 F. Supp. 3d
833, 860-61 (D. Ariz. Jan. 5, 2015) (prohibiting Maricopa County Attorney Bill Montgomery and
Sheriff Joe Arpaio from enforcing two identity theft statutes to the extent the laws address actions
committed with the intent to obtain employment). Imposing criminal penalties for driving without a
license and/or insurance is one of the easiest ways to criminalize noncitizens in states that prohibit
the grant of such licenses to noncitizens. Kevin R. Johnson, Driver's Licenses and Undocumented
Immigrants: The Future of Civil Rights Law?, 5 NEV. L.J. 213, 215-16 (2004).
86. See, e.g., Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Plaintiffs'
arguments) (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. The DACA bars are considerably broader than the criminal deportation and exclusion
grounds of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Compare Napolitano Memorandum, supra note 28,
at 1, with Immigration and Nationality Act § 237(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(2) (2015). The INA provisions
contain no deportation provision for three non-significant misdemeanors unless one or more of those
offenses is also an aggravated felony or crime involving moral turpitude. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(2)(A).
88. See, e.g., GORDON, supra note 24, at 46-49; Lee, supra note 24, at 1141; Wishnie, supra
note 24, at 195.
89. See, e.g., Catholic Charities, supra note 65. This issue is also at the heart of ongoing
studies that I have pursued with a research team funded by the Russell Sage Foundation. For a dis-
cussion of that research, see Navigating Liminal Legalities along Pathways to Citizenship: Immi-
grant Vulnerability and the Role of Mediating Institutions, RUSSELL SAGE FOUND.,
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role in reshaping eligibility criteria at the administrative level. "Stake-
holders" including immigrants' rights organizations, chambers of com-
merce, and restrictionist organizations play a role in how criteria are de-
fined, and although private lobbying is an element in any lawmaking
process, private power is more immediately felt in the shaping of the
eligibility criteria because it is so fluid relative to the process for reform
of comparable legislative or formal administrative rules.90
Ultimately, individuals with liminal legal status are often in the po-
sition of asking for inclusion in the form of an administrative act of
grace, 9 rather than asking an adjudicator to enforce a right.9 2 There is no
appeal outside of an administrative agency for a denial of DACA. The
shifting criteria is entirely defined and applied within the agency. Ad-
ministrative agents make determinations about status "via a calculation
that remains almost entirely hidden but for the traces it leaves in state-
ments about he value of particular kinds of proof for establishing those
statuses."93 Courts exempt themselves from weighing in on these deter-
minations, either as a matter of formal legal practice,94 or through the
exercise of an all-encompassing deference that in fact shields administra-
tive policies and decision making from any real review.
In sum, liminal legal status is unstable. Legal protections emerge
and recede, and basic protection from banishment is often bought and
sold. Basic liberties-freedom of movement, family unification, freedom
from detention 96-are bestowed as an act of grace, not of right. Individu-
als are particularly vulnerable to governmental error and whim, and their
basic freedoms are often contingent on the actions and decisions of a host
of private actors. Liminal legal status obviously affects the lived experi-
ence of its bearers. In the case of Salvadorans and Guatemalans who
http://www.russellsage.org/awarded-project/navigating-liminal-legalities-along-pathways-to-
citizenship-immigrant-vulnerability- (last visited Oct. 12, 2015).
90. See Family, supra note 65, at 570-71 (discussing the benefits of formal process); see also
Manning & Stumpf, supra note 66 (discussing this downside of"liminal law").
91. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 596-98 (1889); Coutin et al., supra
note 3, at 99-100; Allison Brownell Tirres, Mercy in Immigration Law, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1563,
1580-81.
92. The positioning of noncitizens as supplicants seeking immigration status as an act of
administrative grace rather than a claim of right is widely acknowledged. See, e.g., Linda Bosniak,
Amnesty in Immigration: Forgetting, Forgiving, Freedom, 16 CRITICAL REV. INT'L SOC. & POL.
PHIL. 344, 355 (2013); Coutin et al., supra note 3, at 99-100; Tirres, supra note 91, at 1580; cf
Jennifer Chac6n, Feminists at the Border, 91 DENv. U. L. REV. 85, 107 (2013) (discussing how the
structure of the immigration law disproportionately positions women in this supplicant position).
93. Coutin et al., supra note 3, at 100.
94. Id.
95. Coutin, Richland, and Fortin focus on the plenary powers doctrine, and thus center the
experience of noncitizens and indigenous populations in their account, but the highly deferential
review that courts apply to administrative decision-making in contexts such as policing, sentencing
and prison administration effectively places many more citizens and denizens in the same legally
tenuous position as that experienced by noncitizens and indigenous populations in the context of the
plenary powers doctrine. See infra Part IV.A-B.
96. All of these rights are tied to the right to remain granted by programs like DACA and
DAPA.
7292015]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
have moved in and out of various protected statuses over the last decade,
the personal and social consequences of liminal legality are explored in
detail in the scholarly literature.9 7 New studies are now giving similar
attention to documenting the social experiences of individuals in the lim-
inal legal statuses created by the DACA program,98 and comparable work
will undoubtedly be done for DAPA recipients should the DAPA pro-
gram move forward.
The foregoing discussion of iconic cases of liminal legality fo-
cused-as does the existing literature-on the experiences of noncitizens
who lack stable legal status in the United States. But the frame of liminal
legality is also useful to understanding how legal residents and citizens
are rendered vulnerable by law. The next section explores how civil and
criminal laws operate in tandem to produce liminal legality among citi-
zens as well as noncitizens.
II. LIMINAL LEGALITY AT THE CIVIL-CRIMINAL BORDER
Previous accounts of liminal legality have focused on noncitizens
on the edges of formal legal immigration status. But even in the realm of
immigration law, noncitizens are not the only people whose lives are
shaped by liminal legality. Many denizens of the United States, including
citizens, experience the effects of liminal legality, often as a direct result
of governance strategies designed to regulate, monitor, and (where pos-
sible) banish its liminal legal subjects. The growing role of criminal jus-
tice actors in the enforcement of civil immigration laws has played an
important role in generating the rise in liminal legality among residents
of immigrant communities. Some immigrant communities are now more
heavily policed and more likely to come into contact with the criminal
justice system as a result of changing enforcement priorities. Their vul-
nerabilities are often viewed as unique insofar as they exist at the inter-
section of criminal and immigration law. But in fact, the interplay of
criminal and civil regulatory regimes that they experience is not at all
uncommon; the liminal legality they experience has much in common
with-and indeed shapes and is shaped by-the experiences of other
heavily policed and socially marginalized communities. This Section
therefore begins with an analysis of the production of liminality in immi-
gration communities regardless of the formal legal status of community
97. See Menjivar, supra note 2, at 1000; see also Susan Bibler Coutin, In the Breach: Citizen-
ship and Its Approximations, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 109, 111-13 (2013); Susan B. Coutin,
Denationalization, Inclusion, and Exclusion: Negotiating the Boundaries of Belonging, 7 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 585, 585-91 (2000).
98. See, e.g., GONZALES & TERRIQUEZ, supra note 74 ("We find that the DACA recipients
we surveyed experienced a pronounced increase in economic opportunities, such as getting a new
job, opening their first bank account, and obtaining their first credit card. . .. Overall, our research
indicates that although DACA opens up some economic opportunities for young aspiring Americans,
it does not address the constant threat of deportation still facing those closest to them, including
mothers, fathers, and siblings.").
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members and then extends the analysis to communities rendered liminal
through their interactions with the criminal justice system. Significantly,
many individuals experience overlapping forms of liminality because of
their race, their geographic location and their immigration status. Their
intersectional vulnerabilities compound the destabilizing effects of each
form of liminality.99
A. Immigration Law and the Production ofLiminality
As a result of relatively recent changes to immigration law and law
enforcement patterns, many individuals with lawful status, including
LPRs, have been forced into increasingly liminal spaces.'" Specific legal
changes have operated to decrease the stability of the legal status of
LPRs. Once treated as citizens in waiting, over the past two decades,
lawful permanent residents have become increasingly vulnerable to de-
portation due to Congress's creation of expansive (and retroactive) re-
moval provisions.0 Registration requirements and the monitoring of
lawful residents have also been on the rise. Thus, even as some unauthor-
ized migrants access more stable (albeit still liminal) status, noncitizens
with lawful status increasingly experience that status as legally liminal.
In her study of unauthorized Brazilian youth in the Northeastern
United States, Kara Cebulko found "that Brazilian young adults [in her
study] recognize[d] a hierarchy with four distinct categories of legal
membership in which the documents and rights conferred from one status
to another-undocumented to liminal legality to LPR to citizen-
increase while the threat of deportability decreases."02 These young
adults' comments on the immigration laws illustrate an awareness of the
broad range of existing legal statuses and the absence of a true le-
gal/illegal binary, but they also tellingly oversimplify the incredibly
complex and sometimes unpredictable ways that formal legal status maps
onto an individual's actual ability to avoid banishment. As a general mat-
ter, lawful permanent resident status is not sufficiently stable or perma-
99. Indeed, individuals who experience the most debilitating intersectional disadvantages are
at the center of Yolanda Vazquez's analysis of an emergent "crimmigration system" in the United
States. See generally Yolanda Vhzquez, Constructing Crimmigration: Latino Subordination in a
"Post-Racial" World, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 599 (2015).
100. See generally HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (2006).
101. Id. at 98.
102. Kara Cebulko, Documented, Undocumented and Liminally Legal: Legal Status During the
Transition to Adulthood for 1.5-Generation Brazilian Immigrants, 55 Soc. Q. 143, 145 (2014).
Cebulko notes that for these young adults, it was "not just liminal legality that challenges the illegal-
legal binary. LPRs, often considered as authorized migrants, experience insecurity because of their
deport- ability, highlighting the precariousness of their legality." Id. LPR status certainly unsettles
the legal/illegal binary, but I would argue further that LPR status is itself liminal, particularly in the
post-1996 legal framework. See discussion infra Parts IlIl.A, Ill.B.
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nent to provide freedom from deportation; indeed, the Brazilian young
adults of Cebulko's study were aware of and noted that fact.103
Cebulko's typology therefore requires further refinement because
LPRs experience differing degrees of stability within that status. Some
LPRs-for example, those who live in heavily policed, restrictionist ju-
risdictions and who have old criminal convictions that might appear to
render them deportable-may experience greater liminality and a greater
likelihood of banishment than an unauthorized noncitizen who is a low
priority for removal and lives in a more immigrant-friendly jurisdiction.
This suggests that LPR status must be treated as categorically liminal.
The particular degree of vulnerability experienced by LPRs will vary
depending on their legal histories, their places of residence, their eco-
nomic statuses, their religion and their phenotypes, among other factors,
but those are highly individualized inquiries that do not correspond neat-
ly to formal legal status. Individuals with liminal legal status may be
more or less secure at various moments in time, and different liminal
legal subjects may be more or less secure relative to other members of
the population. Any attempt to situate liminality as a midway point be-
tween formal legality and formal illegality thus requires a distortion of
both the actual mechanics of law and the lived experience of many limi-
nal legal subjects with varying formal legal statuses.
Notably, Congressional proposals to legalize the immigration status
of certain unauthorized migrants would rely upon and expand the liminal
legality of lawful residents. Some proposals would eliminate the possibil-
ity of citizenship completely, evincing a preference for permanent limi-
nality.10 But even the viable proposals with a path to citizenship require
extensive periods of legal residence before legalized noncitizens would
even become eligible for lawful permanent resident status. The Senate's
2013 reform bill, for example, would require most noncitizens present
without authorization to accumulate about ten years of blue card status
before gaining lawful permanent resident status.105 From there, it will
usually be another three to five years until naturalization.'06 For a popula-
tion that, by definition, already will have survived several years of post-
entry screening, o7 this would be an unprecedented period of liminal le-
gality prior to citizenship in the United States.
103. Cebulko, supra note 102.
104. This strategy has been promoted by presidential hopeful Jeb Bush, among others. JEB
BusH & CLINT BOLICK, IMMIGRATION WARS: FORGING AN AMERICAN SOLUTION 42-44 (2013).
105. Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, S. 744,
113th Cong. § 2212 (2013).
106. Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 316(a)(1), 319(a), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1427(a)(1), 1430(a)
(2015).
107. Cf Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure ofImmigration Law, 59
STAN. L. REV. 809, 811-13 (2007) (observing the value of such post-entry screening and arguing




Thus, even as the creation of legally liminal spaces can generate
protective reprieves from legal marginalization, they also can be con-
structed in ways that forestall, complicate, or obviate more complete
integration measures. The trend in immigration law over the past three
decades has favored the expansion of liminal legal status at the expense
of more integrative and secure legal statuses for noncitizens on the path
to citizenship.08 Indeed, in its more recent decisions, the Supreme Court
has acknowledged that the bestowal of federal administrative grace is a
central feature of the operation of contemporary immigration law.1oo
These trends in law have been compounded by trends in law enforce-
ment, because even as the path to citizenship has become more drawn
out and more perilous, enforcement efforts that target immigrant com-
munities have been on the rise.
Liminal legality thus characterizes the lives of many noncitizens
with various forms of legal status or presence. The experience of liminal-
ity is, for example, quite notable among noncitizens who fall under the
growing umbrella of temporary humanitarian forms of legal authoriza-
tion. In a recent survey of 108 noncitizens with lawful immigration status
ranging from immigrant visas administered pursuant to the Violence
Against Women Act to more temporary forms of relief like U visas, TPS,
and asylum-seeker status, sociologists Leisy Abrego and Sarah Lakhani
found that noncitizens with lawful status "remain vulnerable to blocked
mobility, persistent fear of deportation, and instability, confusion and
self-blame."10 Immigrants who are authorized to remain in these kinds
of legal statuses are often treated as if they are undocumented, both be-
cause most people-including governmental actors-are unaware of the
existence, let alone the nature, of these forms of relief, and because anti-
immigrant hostility is unbounded by law."' The "nebulous character of
liminal, humanitarian legal categories in a broader inhospitable context
may create difficulties when immigrants seek to convert their status into
tangible resources by signaling their legality to social intermediaries who
dispense benefits and control opportunities.""l2 Abrego and Lahkani con-
clude that "in the current political context, the harsh consequences of
108. See MOTOMURA, supra note 100, at 5-6; Heeren, supra note 30, at 1133-45;.
109. See, eg, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2505-07 (2012) (finding section 6 of
Arizona's S.B. 1070 unconstitutional because it undercut the federal administrative discretion need-
ed to implement federal immigration laws). Adam Cox argues that the Arizona decision "elevate[s]
prosecutorial decisions by executive branch officials to the status of law for purposes of preemption
analysis." Adam B. Cox, Enforcement Redundancy and the Future ofimmigration Law, 2012 SUP.
CT. REV. 31, 54. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), also implicitly validates this exercise of
administrative grace with its acknowledgment of the propriety of bargaining over immigration
consequences in criminal cases. In this way, the Padilla court acknowledges the reality recently
described by Jason Cade: "Back-end adjudicators are reduced to a much-diminished role in immigra-
tion courts. Thus, equity enters the deportation system, if at all, primarily through enforcement
discretion." Jason A. Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 661, 683 (2015).
110. Abrego & Lakhani, supra note 3, at 265.




dehumanizing immigrants affect not only undocumented immigrants but
also those whose presence is legally approved."I13
In fact, the spillover effects can be even more pronounced-the cur-
rent climate of immigration policing affects whole communities, regard-
less of immigration status. Unfortunately, even as legal uncertainty has
become a more pervasive feature of immigrant life, enforcement efforts
that target immigrant communities have been on the rise. This, in turn,
brings a broader ambit of both noncitizens and citizens into situations of
legal precarity.
B. Immigration Enforcement and the Production ofLiminality
Throughout U.S. history, and no less so now, concerns about sup-
posed threats to the national character posed by immigration of people
"different" from native residents along axes of race, culture, and religion
have helped to drive waves of exclusionary immigration laws and en-
forcement practices.114 Such policies wax and wane.
Beginning in the early 1990s, the United States experienced a reviv-
al of restrictionist political sentiment that helped to drive election out-
comes and shape policies at the federal,'15 state,"16 and local" 7 levels.
113. Id. at 287.
114. See generally KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE "HUDDLED MASSES" MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND
CIVIL RIGHTS 152-54 (2004) (charting this history of exclusions on various grounds); KANSTROOM,
supra note 5, at 91 (charting this history of exclusions on various grounds); Kerry Abrams, Polyga-
my, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641, 641 (2005)
(analyzing the 1875 Page Act as an exclusionary law motivated by racial concerns); Gabriel J. Chin,
Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46
UCLA L. REV. 1, 28-29 (1998); Bill Ong Hing, No Place for Angels: In Reaction to Kevin Johnson,
2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 559, 590-91 (discussing anti-semitism in immigration policy during the World
War II era); Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship: On Asian American History and the Loss of Citizen-
ship Through Marriage, 53 UCLA L. REV. 405, 409-10 (2005).
115. See, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-32, §
432, 110 Stat. 1214; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546; Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105; Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-296, 116 Stat. 2135; Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638.
116. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, Popular Democracy, and
California s Proposition 187: The Political Relevance and Legal Irrelevance of Race, 70 WASH. L.
REV. 629, 632-34 (1995) (discussing the political dynamics giving rise to California's restrictionist
Proposition 187); S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, The Importance of the
Political in Immigration Federalism, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1431, 1431 (2012) (discussing the political
factors that generate subfederal immigration laws).
117. See, e.g., Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-13 (Aug. 15, 2006), available at
https://www.aclu.org/hazleton-pa-ordinance-no-2006-13; Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance 2952
(Jan. 22, 2008). Both laws have been struck down on preemption grounds. Villas at Parkside Part-
ners v. City of Farmers Branch, 701 F. Supp. 2d 835, 857 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (ruling that federal law
preempted Farmers Branch Ordinance 2952), affd, 675 F.3d 802 (5th Cir. 2012), affd on reh'g en
banc, 726 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2013); Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 555 (M.D. Pa.
2007) (holding that federal law preempted Hazleton's rental ordinance against undocumented immi-
grants), affd in part, rev'd in part, 724 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Karla Mari McKanders,
Welcome to Hazleton! "Illegal" Immigrants Beware: Local Immigration Ordinances and What the
Federal Government Must Do About It, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 10-11 (2007); Huyen Pham, When
Immigration Borders Move, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1115, 1126-27 (2009); Rose Cuison Villazor, "Sanctu-
ary Cities " and Local Citizenship, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 573, 575-76 (2010).
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While the restrictionist impulse was not uniform," 8 exclusionary efforts
targeting immigrants outweighed inclusive, integrationist efforts. At-
tempts to legalize longtime residents lacking legal status failed repeated-
ly,' 9 but funding for immigration enforcement rose steadily and signifi-
cantly.120 Ironically, having campaigned on multilingual promises of
immigration reform, President Barack Obama has become the "Deporter-
in-Chief,"l21 presiding over the late-stage rise of "a formidable immigra-
tion enforcement machine[]"l22 and the greatest number of deportations
in the nation's history.123 Building upon and amplifying the policies of
the Clinton and second Bush administrations, the Obama administration
has pursued expansive and aggressive enforcement policies both at the
border and in the interior of the country.'24
118. See Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance ofthe Local in Immigration Regulation, 106
MICH. L. REV. 567, 567 (2008) (discussing integrationist efforts). After 2012, the tide seemed to turn
away from enforcement-related measures in favor of more integrationist approaches as the subfeder-
al level. See, e.g., ANN MORSE ET AL., NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2013
IMMIGRATION REPORT, available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/2013-immigration-
report.aspx#4.
119. See Rachel Weiner, How Immigration Reform Failed, Over and Over, WASH. POST (Jan.
30, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/01/30/how-immigration-reform-
failed-over-and-over/ (discussing the failures of immigration reform in recent years, including failed
comprehensive immigration reform (CIR) bills in 2005, 2006, and 2007, and mentioning the failure-
prone Dream Act); see also Muzaffar Chishti & Faye Hipsman, U.S. Immigration Reform Didn't
Happen in 2013; Will 2014 Be the Year?, MIGRATION POL'Y INST. (Jan. 9, 2014),
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/us-immigration-reform-didnt-happen-2013-will-2014-be-
year (discussing failure of the 2013 CIR bill); Elise Foley, DREAM Act Vote Fails in Senate,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/18/dream-act-vote-
senate n 798631.html (discussing the failure of the DREAM Act in 2011 and previous failures).
120. Jennifer M. Chac6n, Overcriminalizing Immigration, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
613, 647-48 (2012).
121. Eyder Peralta, National Council ofLa Raza Dubs Obama 'Deporter-In-Chief,' NPR (Mar.
4, 2014, 6:30 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/03/04/285907255/national-council-
of-la-raza-dubs-obama-deporter-in-chief (quoting National Council of La Raza President Janet
Murguia) (internal quotation marks omitted).
122. DORIS MEISSNER ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES: THE RISE OF A FORMIDABLE MACHINERY 12 (2013), available at
http://camegie.org/fileadmin/Media/Image Galleries/immigration enforcementinusMPIreport.
pdf.
123. Id. at 7-8. There is some dispute over this honor, with critics who favor a more restric-
tionist immigration policy pointing out that the bulk of these formal removals occur at the border,
while enforcement in the interior is declining when compared to the policies of the late Bush II
presidency. See Caitlin Dickson, Is Obama Really the Deporter-in-Chief? Yes and No., DAILY
BEAST (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/04/30/is-obama-really-the-
deporter-in-chief-yes-and-no.html.
124. Border efforts, both genuine and optical, still substantially outweigh interior enforcement
efforts. See Dickson, supra note 123. Indeed, just about the only thing the U.S. Congress can seem to
agree on is that you can never have enough boots on the ground on the U.S.-Mexico border. In 1993,
there were around 4,000 border patrol agents in the US. See, e.g., U.S. Customs & Border Prot.,
Border Patrol Agent Staffing by Fiscal Year, CBP.GOV,
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/BP%20Staffing%20FYI992-FY2014_0.pdf (last
updated Sept. 20, 2014). Now, there are more than 20,000, almost all of whom are assigned to the
Southwestern border region. Id. The failed comprehensive immigration reform bill passed by the
Senate in 2013 would have further increased this number. Border Security, Economic Opportunity,
and Immigration Modernization Act, S. 744, 113th Cong. § 1102 (2013).
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Congress has enabled these practices. Unlike almost every other
line in the budget, spending on immigration enforcement seems to know
few constraints. In a 2013 report on immigration enforcement in the
United States Migration Policy Institute (MPI) found that:
Spending for the federal government's two main immigration en-
forcement agencies-US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and
US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)-and its primary
enforcement echnology initiative, the US Visitor and Immigrant Sta-
tus Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program, surpassed $17.9 bil-
lion in fiscal year (FY) 2012. This amount is nearly 15 times the
spending level of the US Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) when IRCA was enacted [in 1986]. In the ensuing 26 years, the
nation has spent an estimated $186.8 billion ($219.1 billion if adjust-
ed to 2012 dollars) on immigration enforcement by INS and its suc-
cessor agencies CBP and ICE, and the US-VISITS program.125
The MPI report only takes into account federal spending here, and
then, only spending by DHS. 126 These figures do not account for the
costs of formal criminal prosecutions for immigration offenses, which
are at historic highs. 12 7 Nor do they account for the increasing role of
state and local law enforcement in immigration enforcement, some of
which is driven by states,1 28 and some by the federal government.129 The
flow of resources into enforcement shows little sign of abatement.
As an outgrowth of this spending, formal removals are at historical-
ly high levels.130 About 80% of these removals are taking place at the
border. 31 The remainder-about 80,000 a year-come from the interior
and involve longtime residents, including longtime lawful permanent
residents who are being removed either because they lack legal authori-
zation to remain or because they have violated the terms of their stay,
usually as a result of a minor criminal conviction.132
125. MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 122, at 3-4.
126. Id. at 4 n.4.
127. Id at 93; Chac6n, supra note 120, at 635-36.
128. See S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010); H.B. 56, 2011 Reg. Sess. (Ala.);
H.B. 87, 151st Gen. Assemb., 2011-12 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011); S.B. 20, 1 19h Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg.
Sess. (S.C. 2011). These laws were largely enjoined on preemption grounds in the period leading up
to and following the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. United States. See, e.g., Arizona v.
United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012); United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1280 (11th
Cir. 2012).
129. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
130. MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 122, at 7.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 134-35. Since 1996, the laws of the US have expanded to require the removal
and permanent return of individuals who have committed a long list of crimes, including relatively
minor offenses, that the Congress has classified as "aggravated felonies," in addition to the usual
removals for CIMTs, and other violations or unauthorized presence. See id. at 7. Removals for
unauthorized presence also trigger ten year bars in the case of anyone whose unauthorized presence
extends longer than a year. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(9)(B), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(9)(B) (2015). Although the composition of the deported population is ever-shifting, official
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Reliance on detention has risen, too. The United States government
now detains well over 400,000 noncitizens each year, some for extended
periods of time, in public and private facilities around the country.133
Throughout this period, various criminal justice actors have played an
increasing, and increasingly contested, role in immigration enforcement
efforts.134
If the goal of all of this enforcement activity is preventing unauthor-
ized migration,35 the effectiveness of all this activity is debatable. Inter-
estingly, these changes are coming at a time when numbers of unauthor-
ized entries into the United States are at historic lows. The number of
records demonstrate that the vast majority of noncitizens removed to date for criminal offenses are
removed for traffic violations and similarly minor offenses. See TANYA MARIA GOLASH-BOZA,
DEPORTED: POLICING IMMIGRANTS, DISPOSABLE LABOR AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM 143 (2015).
133. C6sar Cuauht6moc Garcia Hemndez, Invisible Spaces and Invisible Lives in Immigration
Detention, 57 HOw. L.J. 869, 869-70 (2014); see also Philip L. Torrey, Immigration Detention's
Unfounded Mandate, 15-04 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, 5-9 (2015) (discussing the practice and politics
of the "bed mandate" and charting the steep rise in the numbers of noncitizens in immigration deten-
tion).
134. Many of the discussions about the role of state and local law enforcement in immigration
policing take place in the context of debates over "immigration federalism." Hiroshi Motomura is
credited with coining the term. Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and
Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1361 (1999) (advocating a federal preroga-
tive in immigration policy in tandem with a rejection of immigration exceptionalism with regard to
individual rights). Some scholars and policymakers have advocated a greater role for state and local
police in the enforcement of federal immigration laws. See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential
Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L.
REV. 179, 183 (2006); Peter H. Schuck & John Williams, Removing Criminal Aliens: The Pitfalls
and Promises of Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 367, 460-61 (1999). Others have ex-
pressed concerns that, at least at present, subfederal officials lack the necessary institutional compe-
tency, legal authority, or necessary oversight mechanism to fairly and constitutionally enforce immi-
gration law. Jennifer M. Chac6n, A Diversion ofAttention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudica-
tion of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1607 (2010) [hereinafter Chac6n, A
Diversion] (contesting the sufficiency of the legal incentive structure to check excesses in policing of
immigrant communities); Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why
Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
965, 986-87 (2004); Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws,
6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1115 (2004). Speaking to the question of subfederal immigration polic-
ing, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled out some forms of participation in the case of Arizona v. United
States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012), but that case also leaves open a broad swath legal terrain for potential
state and local immigration enforcement activities on the ground. Jennifer M. Chac6n, Policing
Immigration After Arizona, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 231, 231-32 (2013); Jennifer M. Chac6n,
The Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 577, 58 1-82 (2012);
Eagly, supra note 84, at 1750-52.
135. Of course, there are many goals to this kind of policy. Border buildups serve a political
messaging function. See Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Why a Wall?, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 147, 158-61
(2012). The growth in the relevant federal agencies-much like the growth in corrections-is also a
source of middle class jobs. And just as African-American women have benefitted from the prolifer-
ation of correction spending, see James Forman, Jr., The Black Poor, Black Elites, and America 's
Prisons, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 791, 798 (2011), the growth in immigration enforcement agencies has
redounded to the benefit of Latinos seeking solid middle class positions with government benefits.
See, e.g., Paulette Chu Miniter, A Border Agent (and Immigrant) Defies Stereotypes, USA TODAY,
May 7, 2007, at 21A (noting that in 2007, CBP "agency spokesman Mario Martinez says at least
6,700 of the country's 12,800 Border Patrol agents identify themselves as Hispanic"). This is not to
suggest that the individuals who have benefitted from this federal spending might not have benefited
more from comparable federal spending in other sectors like infrastructure development or educa-
tion. But it does serve as a reminder of the complexities involved in assessing the "benefits" of
federal programs like these.
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individuals crossing the southern border without authorization is down
significantly;136 they have not been this low since the 1970s.137 In the
meantime, the size of the unauthorized population in the United States
has remained stagnant for several years.'38 Net unauthorized migration is
currently negative.'3 9 According to the Pew Hispanic Center, the estimat-
ed number of unauthorized migrants in the United States peaked around
2006-2007 at about 12 million and has since fallen to about 11.2 million,
where it has been holding steady for some time. 14 0
If border enforcement is playing some kind of a role in reshaping
entry patterns,141 though, enforcement has thus far not generated the "at-
136. Robert Warren & Donald Kerwin, Beyond DAPA and DACA: Revisiting Legislative
Reform in Light of Long-Term Trends in Unauthorized Immigration to the United States, 3 J. ON
MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY 80, 92-93 (2015).
137. Id. at 87. The drop in Mexican migration is a key factor here. Much of this has been
attributed to increasing economic opportunities in Mexico and declining economic opportunities in
the U.S. Id. at 100. But this trend has been accompanied by a numerically smaller but still significant
rise in apprehensions of women and children migrating from the Northern Triangle countries of
Central America-Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador-pointing to the important role that push
factors in home countries play in shaping migration. Id at 96.
138. Id. at 83
139. Id. These statistics raise important questions about what it would take to demonstrate a
secure border to those politicians who continue to demagogue around the need for such "security."
140. Paul Taylor et al., Unauthorized Immigrants: Length of Residency, Patterns of
Parenthood, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Dec. 1, 2011),
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2011/12/01/unauthorized-immigrants-length-of-residency-pattems-of-
parenthood/; see also Warren & Kerwin, supra note 136, at 83; Growth in Unauthorized Immigra-
tion Has Leveled Off PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Sept. 3, 2014),
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2014/09/03/as-growth-stalls-unauthorized-immigrant-population-
becomes-more-settled/ph-2014-09-03-immigration-OI/.
It is difficult to assess with any certainty the strength of the causal connection between
recent enforcement efforts and migration flow. Longitudinal surveys suggest that migration flows do
not fluctuate in direct relationship to enforcement policies and are more heavily influenced by eco-
nomic conditions. MASSEY ET AL., supra note 73, at 7-9; Wayne A. Cornelius, Controlling "Un-
wanted" Immigration: Lessons from the United States, 1993-2004, 31 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION
STUD. 775, 790 (2005); Wayne A. Cornelius, Impacts of Border Enforcement on Unauthorized
Mexican Migration to the United States, BORDER BATTLES (Sept. 26, 2006),
http://borderbattles.ssrc.org/Cornelius/. On the other hand, the most recent leveling off and decline in
the unauthorized population can be traced to trends that predate the Great Recession. Warren &
Kerwin, supra note 136, at 90. This suggests that the state of the domestic economy may be just one
factor in the change. Improving economic conditions in Mexico are another oft-cited reason for the
decline in the unauthorized migrant population from Mexico in particular. See id (noting that Mexi-
cans constituted nearly 70% of unauthorized migrant arrivals throughout the 1980s and 1990s, but
now constitute only about 33% of those arrivals). Similarly, the recent rise in entrants from the
Northern Triangle countries of Central America are largely attributable to deteriorating conditions in
those countries rather than any events in the United States. See id at 96. Ultimately, it is quite diffi-
cult to disaggregate the precise effects of these internal and external developments on migration
flows.
141. The federal government's border enforcement strategy has largely ended circular patterns
of migration to the United States, thereby changing not only the places of entry of border crossers
(hence the notable rise of border deaths), but also the nature of work (from seasonal to permanent,
with an ensuing quest for year-round work); place of settlement (from traditional receiving states
like Texas, California and New York to states throughout the Midwest and Southeast); the de-
mographics of the migrant flow (with more crossings for family unification purposes); and a shift in
the unauthorized population from predominantly migrants who entered without inspection to pre-
dominantly visa overstayers, a significant portion of whom are from outside of Mexico and Central
America. Bill Ong Hing, The Dark Side of Operation Gatekeeper, 7 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
121, 125, 164 (2001); see also Warren & Kerwin, supra note 136, at 94.
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trition"l 42 of settled immigrant populations. Perhaps this is because so
many unauthorized residents have lived in the United States for so
long. 143
Indeed, notwithstanding the fact that they bear the brunt of increas-
ingly draconian enforcement efforts, many unauthorized migrants feel
themselves to be citizens, even if they lack any formal legal status.M
This is what prompted undocumented youth in the United States to or-
ganize for political change with sit-ins, anti-deportation campaigns or-
chestrated through social media, the mobilization of the undocu-bus, and
the proud proclamation of sin papeles sin rniedo-without papers and
unafraid. Far from spurring attrition, the crackdown on long-settled resi-
dents without legal status consolidated political mobilizations by indi-
viduals with no citizenship and (some would argue) no claim of right to
participate in the political process. This mobilization, in turn, was largely
responsible for the creation of the significant new temporarily protective
immigration statuses previously discussed.145 In other words, the en-
forcement strategies that increased the legal vulnerabilities of certain
immigrant populations also gave rise to the political forces that ultimate-
ly generated their increased protection. Immigration enforcement pro-
grams and deferred action programs are opposite sides of the same coin:
both are governance strategies aimed at liminal legal subjects, but en-
forcement pushes toward marginalization while deferred action pushes
toward inclusion."6
142. Kris Kobach initially applied the phrase "attrition through enforcement" to the context of
immigration policing. Kris W. Kobach, Attrition through Enforcement: A Rational Approach to
Illegal Immigration, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 155, 157 (2008). The preamble to Arizona's S.B.
1070 explicitly expressed the achievement of enforcement by attrition as a goal of the statute. ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1509(A), 13-2928(C), 13-3883(A)(5), invalidated by Arizona v. United
States 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). Immigration attorney Hans Meyer characterizes the resulting en-
forcement policies as a "war of attrition," and notes the many costs of this war. Hans Meyer, Re-
marks at the Denver University Law Review Crimmigration Symposium (Feb. 2, 2015), available at
http://du-denverlaw.hosted.panopto.com/Panopto/Pages/Viewer.aspx?id=93a85392-078a-414e-
84bd-5607b4fb08d3. The notion of attrition through enforcement also spawned a related discourse
concerning the desirability of enacting polices that prompt noncitizens to "self-deport." Mitt Rom-
ney used the phrase in his 2012 presidential campaign, Michael Barbaro, On Air and Before Audi-
ences, Romney Makes Push for Hispanic Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2012, at Al 5, and that term
made another recent appearance in Judge Hanen's opinion in Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d
591, 634-35 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
143. Taylor et al., supra note 140 ("Nearly two-thirds of the 10.2 million unauthorized adult
immigrants in the United States have lived in this country for at least 10 years and nearly half are
parents of minor children . . .").
144. See Abrego, supra note 3, at 729-31; GONZALES & TERRIQUEZ, supra note 74; Stephen
Lee, Growing Up Outside the Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1405, 1407-08 (2015) (reviewing HIROSHI
MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW (2014)); Rose Cuison Villazor, The Undocumented
Closet, 92 N.C. L. Rev. 1, 51-53, 57 (2013).
145. WALTER J. NICHOLLS, THE DREAMERS: HOW THE UNDOCUMENTED YOUTH MOVEMENT
TRANSFORMED THE IMMIGRANT RIGHTS DEBATE 30 (2013).
146. At the same time, the inclusive dimensions of the deferred action program arguably un-
dercut, at least for a time, political mobilization efforts aimed at more comprehensive legalization
policies, even as they fail to achieve full incorporation.
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But the massive and unprecedented enforcement activities-the mil-
itarized border,147 the high-profile raids of homes and workplaces,14 8 the
anti-immigrant bravado of certain state and local actors,149 and the result-
ing churn of migrants through criminal courts, prisons, detentions cen-
ters, and deportation proceedings-have increased the legal liminality of
many individuals living in immigrant communities, not just those with-
out legal status. Increased border policing, interior workplace raids, and
warrantless home entries by federal immigration officials and state and
local police officers have not just affected unauthorized migrants, or
even just their families, but entire communities where noncitizens live
and work.150
In the realm of immigration enforcement, individuals can be, and
are,profiled based on ethnicity and national origin. It is a long-
established constitutional principle that race is a permissible factor in
federal immigration policing and that federal officials can rely primarily
on racial markers to make policing decisions in the immigration con-
text. 5' Indeed, the most recent Department of Justice guidelines on racial
profiling expressly exclude immigration policing from their ambit.152
Thus, when it comes to immigrant communities, formal legal guarantees
of equal protection and general guidelines against racial profiling are thin
in their protective scope against state and local actors purportedly en-
gaged in ordinary policing activities. These policing activities can be
combined with and converted into immigration enforcement activities,
and when they are, the traditional protections that might otherwise have
inhered in the criminal process are not triggered.153
147. PETER ANDREAS, BORDER GAMES: POLICING THE U.S.-MEXICO DIVIDE 94 (2d ed. 2009);
Gulasekaram, supra note 135, at 147; Hing, supra note 141, at 129, 161.
148. See Jennifer M. Chac6n, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 135, 143-44 (2009).
149. Governor Jan Brewer and Sheriff Joe Arpaio are two easy examples. See, e.g., Femanda
Santos, In Arizona, Confusion on Ruling on Migrants, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2012, at Al2; cf Fer-
nanda Santos, An Added Mission for Arizona Sheriffs Immigration Posse: School Patrols, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 17, 2013, at Al4. The federal government has no shortage, either. Representative Steve
King's statement that most unauthorized migrants are drug smugglers, which explains their "calves
the size of cantaloupes" is a case in point. Todd Beamon & John Bachman, Rep. Steve King Slams
Norquist over Attacks on Immigration, NEWSMAX (Jul. 18, 2013, 5:59 PM),
http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/king-norquist-attacks-
immigration/2013/07/18/id/515882/#ixzz2ZVT2GoP5 (quoting Representative Steve King).
150. See, e.g., AJAY CHAUDRY ET AL., FACING OUR FUTURE: CHILDREN IN THE AFTERMATH
OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 41-65 (2010), available at
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412020_FacingOurFuture final.pdf (documenting the negative
impact of immigration detention on the children of detainees).
151. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884-85 (1975). The case seems dated
and problematic to the modem reader, but he DOJ continues to rely upon it in litigating equal pro-
tection and fourth amendment claims, so its continued significance is clear.
152. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE FOR FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
REGARDING THE USE OF RACE, ETHNICITY, GENDER, NATIONAL ORIGIN, RELIGION, SEXUAL
ORIENTATION, OR GENDER IDENTITY 2 (2014), available at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/pages/attachments/2014/12/08/use-of-race-policy.pdf.
153. Chac6n, A Diversion, supra note 134, at 1602-06, 1620-22.
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The Second Circuit's recent opinion in Maldonado v. Holder,154
concluding that national origin profiling by local police did not constitute
an egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment, both highlighted and
amplified the problem.'5 5 In that case, the Second Circuit reasoned that
national origin profiling is a central and accepted component of immigra-
tion enforcement.'5 6 The court concluded that there is no legal remedy
for such profiling even if the actors who engaged in the initial profiling
were not legally sanctioned to enforce immigration law at all.'
The consequences of such profiling, of course, are felt not only in
"sweatshops, forced brothels, and other settings in which illegal aliens
are exploited and threatened-and much worse,"'5 8 but also in neighbor-
hoods across the country with large immigrant populations unpopular
with the political establishment. Official investigations by the U.S. De-
partment of Justice in jurisdictions as disparate as East Haven, Connecti-
cut,'5 9 Alamance County, North Carolina,16 0 and Maricopa County, Ari-
zona,161 describe immigrant communities living in fear of the police and
rampant racial profiling of Latinos as a standard element of policing
practices as local police prioritized immigration enforcement goals.'62 In
this way, efforts to target legally liminal immigrants ultimately moves
154. 763 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2014).
155. See id. at 162-63. The case involved noncitizens who were identified as day laborers and
seized by state and local officials who then turned the noncitizens over to ICE. The plaintiffs alleged
an "egregious violation" of the Fourth Amendment-the standard that is required for suppression in
removal proceedings under INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984). Id. at 158-59 (quot-
ing Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2006)). The court found that reliance
on national origin was an essential part of immigration policing, and swept under the rubric of na-
tional origin the markers of ethnicity at issue in the case. Id. at 162-63.
156. See id. at 162-63, 166-67.
157. See id. at 163.
158. Id. at 162.
159. Letter from Thomas A. Perez, Asst. Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice Civil Rights Div., to
Hon. Jospeh A. Maturo, Jr., Mayor of E. Haven, Conn. 1-2 (Dec. 19, 2011) [hereinafter Perez,
Conn. Letter], available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/easthavenfindletter_ 12-
19-1I.pdf (finding the East Haven Police Department (EHPD) "engages in discriminatory policing
against Latinos, including but not limited to targeting Latinos for discriminatory traffic enforcement,
treating Latino drivers more harshly than non-Latino drivers after a traffic stop, and intentionally and
woefully facility to design and implement internal systems of control that would identify, track, and
prevent such misconduct").
160. Letter from Thomas A. Perez, Asst. Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice Civil Rights Div., to
Clyde B. Albright, Cnty. Att'y, Alamance Cnty., N.C. & Chuck Kitchen, Att'y, Turrentine Law Firm
1-2 (Sept. 18, 2012) [hereinafter Perez, Alamance Letter], available at
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/171201291812462488198.pdf (finding that "ASCO -
through the actions of its deputies, supervisors, and command staff-unlawfully targets, stops,
detains, and arrests Latinos").
161. Letter from Thomas A. Perez, Asst. Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice Civil Rights Div., to
Bill Montgomery, Cnty. Att'y, Maricopa Cnty., Ariz. 1-2 (Dec. 15, 2011) [hereinafter Perez, Ariz.
Letter], available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/mcso-findletter_12-15-1l.pdf
(finding that the Maricopa County Sheriffs Office (MSCO), "through the actions of its deputies,
supervisory staff, and command staff, engages in racial profiling of Latinos; unlawfully stops, de-
tains, and arrests Latinos; and unlawfully retaliates against individuals who complain about or criti-
cize MCSO's policies or practices").
162. See Perez, Alamance Letter, supra note 160; Perez, Ariz. Letter, supra note 161; Perez,
Conn. Letter, supra note 159.
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more members of targeted minority groups, including many citizens, into
the criminal justice system, thereby marginalizing or completely banish-
ing them through means other than deportation. The criminal law en-
forcement system and the immigration law enforcement system, even
when not formally intertwined, generate mutually reinforcing enforce-
ment efforts that focus on disfavored minority groups.163 But, as the next
subsection will relate, these developments are not limited to the sphere of
"crimmigration."
C. Legal Liminality at the Blurred Civil-Criminal Border
For the past two decades, the criminal and immigration enforcement
systems have been on parallel tracks of rising severity. The similar and
sometimes interrelated developments in these areas of law initially gave
rise to the growth of a fairly extensive literature-one of which is in-
creasingly referred to as a "crimmigration" literature. 16 This literature
163. See GOLASH-BOZA, supra note 132; see also Vhzquez, supra note 99, at 647-49. Federal
enforcement may suffer from the same blindspots. Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles have found
evidence to support the conclusion that the speed of the rollout of the federal Secure Communities
program to particular jurisdictions correlated more closely to the size of the Hispanic population than
to the size of the jurisdiction's noncitizen population or the degree to which a given jurisdiction was
characterized as a high crime area. Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, 80 U.
CHI. L. REV. 87, 88 (2013). Cox and Miles note that these findings accord with Bernard Harcourt's
notion that seemingly rational models of policing "can often obscure the ways in which seemingly
neutral rules can in practice concentrate the burdens of law enforcement on minority communities."
Id. at 133.
164. The severity turn in the criminal justice system has a longer trajectory, dating back to the
1970s, which has been documented in numerous scholarly accounts. See, e.g., MICHELLE
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 54-58
(2010); DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 14-15 (2001); LoIC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE
NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY, 195-98 (2009); Mary Louise Frampton et al.,
Introduction, in AFTER THE WAR ON CRIME: RACE, DEMOCRACY, AND A NEW RECONSTRUCTION I-
2 (Mary Louise Frampton et al. eds., 2008); David Garland, Epilogue, in MASS IMPRISONMENT:
SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 179-81 (David Garland ed., 2001); Tracey L. Meares, Mass
Incarceration: Who Pays the Price for Criminal Offending?, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 295,
295 (2004).
Immigration severity manifests as early as the late 1980s with the expansion of the aggra-
vated felony category of deportability to further the goals of the war on drugs. See Jeff Yates et al., A
War on Drugs or a War on Immigrants? Expanding the Definition of "Drug Trafficking" in Deter-
mining Aggravated Felon Status for Noncitizens, 64 MD. L. REV. 875, 884-86 (2005); Nancy
Morawetz, Rethinking Drug Inadmissibility, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 163, 173 (2008). But 1996
marks the true turning point in immigration law. See infra Part III.A.
165. Some of the foundational literature predates the crimmigration label, and emerged in the
period following Congress's legislative enactments, beginning in the late 1980s, but really taking off
after 1996, as Congress first gradually and then quite suddenly expanded the scope and consequenc-
es of criminal grounds of deportation and exclusion while simultaneously reducing procedural pro-
tections and avenues for discretionary relief. This literature maps the increasingly punitive nature of
immigration law, the criminalization of immigration violations, and the proliferating immigration
consequences of criminal convictions. See, e.g., KANSTROOM, supra note 5, at 13; Kevin R. John-
son, The Antiterrorism Act, the Immigration Reform Act, and Ideological Regulation in the Immigra-
tion Laws: Important Lessons for Citizens and Noncitizens, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 833, 838-43 (1997);
Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the Post-September 11th
"Pale of Law," 29 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 639, 651-52 (2004); Daniel Kanstroom, Deporta-
tion, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1889, 1890-91 (2000); Stephen H. Legomsky, Reforming the Criteria for the Exclu-
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sion and the Deportation of Alien Criminal Offenders, 12 DEF. ALIEN 64, 64-65 (1989); Maria
Isabel Medina, The Criminalization of Immigration Law: Employer Sanctions and Marriage Fraud,
5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 669, 671-72 (1997); Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between
Immigration and Crime Control After September 11th, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 83-85 (2005);
Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 97, 99 (1998); Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least Some
of the Constitution's Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 305, 305-06
(2000); Margaret H. Taylor & Ronald F. Wright, The Sentencing Judge as Immigration Judge, 51
EMORY L.J. 1131, 1132 (2002); Wishnie, supra note 134, at 1084-85; Victor C. Romero, Note,
Whatever Happened to the Fourth Amendment?: Undocumented Immigrants' Rights After INS v.
Lopez-Mendoza and United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 999, 1001-02 (1992).
A second wave of scholarship examined procedural connections and emerging parallel
logics in criminal and immigration law enforcement. See, e.g., BILL ONG HING, DEPORTING OUR
SOULS: VALUES, MORALITY, AND IMMIGRATION POLICY 140-41 (2006); Raquel Aldana, Of Katz
and "Aliens": Privacy Expectations and the Immigration Raids, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1081, 1083
(2008); Chac6n, A Diversion, supra note 134, at 1564-65; Jennifer M. Chac6n, Commentary, Unse-
cured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV.
1827, 1831 (2007) [hereinafter Chac6n, Unsecured Borders]; Jennifer M. Chacon, Whose Communi-
ty Shield?: Examining the Removal of the "Criminal Street Gang Member," 2007 U. CIII. LEGAL F.
317, 321-23; Anil Kalhan, The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Implications of Interior Immigration
Enforcement, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1137, 1147-48 (2008); Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the
Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the Nature ofImmigration Removal
Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 289 (2008); Morawetz, supra note 164, at 166-67;
Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L.
REV. 367, 369-73 (2006). Stumpf's article is the source of the crimmigration label, which I discuss
further below. See Part IV.B.
More recent scholarship has continued to refine and elaborate on the systemic and particu-
larized connections and the more general parallels between these two enforcement systems. See, e.g.,
HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 57-61 (2014); Jason A. Cade, The Plea
Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34 CARDOzO L. REV. 1751, 1754-55 (2013);
Gabriel J. Chin & Margaret Love, Status as Punishment: A Critical Guide to Padilla v. Kentucky, 25
CRIM. JUST. 21, 25 (2010); Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The Unconstitutionality ofState Regu-
lation of Immigration Through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 251, 253-55 (2011); Cox & Miles,
supra note 163, at 87-88; Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Varia-
tion in Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1129-31 (2013); Eagly, supra note 84, at 1816-
17; Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. 1281, 1349-51 (2010); C6sar
Cuauhtemoc Garcia Hernndez, Creating Crimmigration, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1457, 1459 (2013);
C6sar Cuauht6moc Garcia Hernandez, Naturalizing Immigration Imprisonment, 103 CALIF. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 114-15); Mary Holper, Confronting Cops in Immigration Courts,
23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 675, 675-76 (2015); Kevin R. Johnson, Essay, How Racial Profiling
in America Became the Law of the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United
States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1007 (2010); Anil Kalhan,
Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, and Privacy,
74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1105, 1107-09 (2013) [hereinafter Kalhan, Immigration Policing]; Daniel Kan-
stroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky: The Challenging Construction of
the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1461, 1462-64 (2011); Christopher N. Lasch,
"Crimmigration" and the Right to Counsel at the Border Between Civil and Criminal Proceedings,
99 IOWA L. REV. 2131, 2132-34 (2014); Christopher N. Lasch, Preempting Immigration Detainer
Enforcement Under Arizona v. United States, 3 WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL'Y 281, 313-30 (2013)
[hereinafter Lasch, Detainer Enforcement]; Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration
Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 471-72
(2007); Allegra M. McLeod, The U.S. Criminal-Immigration Convergence and its Possible Undoing,
49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 105, 107-49 (2012); Motomura, supra note 84, at 1821-22; Rick Su, Police
Discretion and Local Immigration Policymaking, 79 UMKC L. REV. 901, 901-03 (2011); Vizquez,
supra note 99, at 640-45.
A subset of this literature has also explored the linkages between national security law and
discourse and immigration law. See, e.g., Muneer 1. Ahmad, Guantanamo is Here: The Military
Commissions Act and Noncitizen Vulnerability, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 1-2; Susan M. Akram &
Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After September II, 2001: The Target-
ing of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295, 297-98 (2002); Chac6n, Unsecured
Borders, supra note 165, at 1830-3 1; Nora V. Demleitner, Immigration Threats and Rewards:
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posits that the criminal law and immigration law regime operate in tan-
dem in ways that make noncitizens uniquely vulnerable to incarceration
(including in immigration detention) and exclusion. It explores both sub-
stantive connections between the criminal and immigration enforcement
systems and the convergence of logics in the criminal and immigration
law spheres. While it has been quite important in sussing out the inter-
connections of nominally unrelated enforcement systems and the dis-
course that fuels them, the "crimmigration" framework may at times also
obscure the important point that the legal vulnerabilities produced by the
interaction of civil and criminal legal mechanisms in heavily policed
communities are not unique to noncitizens. Outside of the bounds of any
"crimmigration" system, the criminal justice system evinces such trends.
The interaction of civil and criminal legal regimes in the production of
liminal legality is acutely evident far beyond the bounds of immigration
enforcement, and the marginalizing effects of this civil-criminal interplay
are ironically aggravated by the efforts of policymakers at the state and
federal level to bring down the incredibly high human and financial costs
of incarceration.
The United States, the world leader in imprisoning its residents,166
appears to be rethinking its heavy reliance on incarceration as the solu-
tion to its social problems.'67 Budgets are an important driver of these
reforms. Although the federal government can print money to enforce its
laws, states have to include criminal justice costs in their balanced budg-
ets, and these groaning budgets have pushed state officials to do things
that would have been unheard of fifteen years ago. This includes reduc-
ing the severity of some offenses and decriminalizing others.168 Marijua-
na has been a particularly popular focal point for the decriminalization
efforts, but states are also experimenting with the decriminalization of
other offenses, including crimes like driving with a suspended license,
disturbing the peace, petty theft, and other regulatory offenses that used
Effective Law Enforcement Tools in the "War" on Terrorism?, 51 EMORY L.J. 1059, 1059-60
(2002); Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling After September II: The Department ofJustice's 2003
Guidelines, 50 LOY. L. REV. 67, 69 (2004); Kevin R. Johnson, September II and Mexican Immi-
grants: Collateral Damage Comes Home, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 849, 850-52 (2003); Stephen H.
Legomsky, The Ethnic and Religious Profiling of Noncitizens: National Security and International
Human Rights, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 161, 161-62 (2005).
166. See sources cited supra note 164.
167. 1 should note that imprisonment is still a central and bloated component of criminal justice
throughout the United States. See, e.g., U.S. Prison Population Declines for Third Consecutive Year,
SENTENCING PROJECT (Dec. 19, 2013), http://sentencingproject.org/detaillnews.cfm?newsid=1720
(noting that the prison population has declined for 3 years in a row, but at "[a]t its 2012 rate of
decline, it would take until 2101, or 88 years, for the U.S. prison population to return to its 1980
level").
168. See, e.g., State Spending for Corrections: Long-Term Trends and Recent Criminal Justice
Policy Reforms, NAT'L Ass'N OF ST. BUDGET OFFICERS 5 (Sept. 11, 2013),
http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/files/pdf/State%20Spending%20for%2OCorrections.pdf (noting
the fiscal pressures driving state-level criminal justice reform).
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to carry jail time.'69 California, one of the nation's leaders in incarcera-
tion, is also potentially leading the way out of the penal expansion with
its realignment efforts.170
At the federal level, the arbitrary crack-cocaine sentencing disparity
that once punished crack possession at a rate of 100 times of that of co-
caine possession has been reduced to the slightly less inexplicable rate of
18-to- 1.'1 Former Attorney General Holder issued explicit guidance to
U.S. Attorneys to exercise their discretion in favor of more lenient
charges in cases involving of low-level drug crimes.172 In the face of
these and other changes, prison populations have shrunk for four years in
a row, and some states are even closing prisons.173 As Alexandra Nata-
poff writes, "Scholars and commentators say hopeful things like 'there
seems good reason to hope the war on crime may soon wind down,'
'mass incarceration has come to an end,' 'the war on drugs is over,' and
the U.S. has become 'a more benevolent nation."'l74
It might be easy to lose sight of the less encouraging aspects of the-
se developments, but it is important to catalogue them. First, an awful lot
of people are still in prisons and jails.1 75 These individuals are denied any
expectation of privacy vis-A-vis the state,176 experience unparalleled lim-
its on human intimacy,177 and are subjected to high rates of documented
169. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1058
(2015).
170. Joan Petersilia & Jessica Greenlick Snyder, Looking Past the Hype: 10 Questions Every-
one Should Ask About California's Prison Realignment, 5 CAL. J. POL. & POL'Y 266, 267 (2013)
(noting that realignment has the potential to substantially reduce incarceration rates without a nega-
tive effect on crime rates, but also noting that implementation might not achieve either or both of
those lofty goals).
171. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2, 125 Stat. 2372, 2372 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). It is not entirely clear why 18-to-I is "fair," but it is
less unfair than it used to be.
172. Holder Calls for New Approach to Prosecuting Low-Level Drug Crimes, PBS
NEWSHOUR (Aug. 12, 2013, 6:02 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/videos/#51054. Interesting-
ly, this non-prosecution policy did not excite the cries of unconstitutionality that accompanied the
parallel exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the immigration context.
173. Natapoff, supra note 169, at 1105.
174. Id. at 1106 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Ian F. Haney L6pez, Post-Racial Racism: Racial
Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023, 1025 (2010));
E.J. Dionne Jr., A More Benevolent Nation?, WASH. PosT, Nov. 17, 2013,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ej-dionne-a-more-benevolent-
nation/2013/11/17/36fc99aa-4e46-l I e3-9890-a I e0997fb0cO story.html; Nick Gillespie, The War on
Drugs is Over (If Obama Wants It), DAILY BEAST (Oct. 30, 2013, 5:45 AM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/10/30/the-drug-war-is-over-if-obama-wants-it.html;
Michael Santos, Mass Incarceration as a Public Policy, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 24, 2012, 11:36
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-santos/mass-incarceration-as-a- p b_1447564.html.
175. In 2012 there were 1,570,397 in state and federal prison. U.S. Prison Population Declines
for Third Consecutive Year, supra note 167.
176. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984).
177. Keramet Reiter, The Pelican Bay Hunger Strike: Resistance within the Structural Con-
straints ofa US Supermax Prison, 113 S. ATLANTIC Q. 579, 579-80 (2014); Russell K. Robinson,
Masculinity as Prison: Sexual Identity, Race, and Incarceration, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1309, 1317-19
(2011); Michael Montgomery, Does 22 '/z Hours Alone in an 8-by-10 Cell Every Day Amount to
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sexual, physical, and emotional abuse.178 Citizens in prison are also de-
nied the right to vote in almost every state.17 ' These individuals subsist in
a legal zone that is devoid of many of the rights and protections available
to those who have not been convicted.180 Their status is not liminal; these
individuals have been banished, at least for a time.
Second, and of central importance to this analysis, many decarcera-
tion schemes generate the xpansion of liminal legal statuses to individu-
als who might not be incarcerated but who are also not free of the reach
of the criminal justice system. Criminal justice may be entering an Eli-
asian moment, insofar as a growing number of people have begun to
express distaste for the nation's heavy reliance on incarceration. 1 At the
same time, however, the resulting decarceration efforts rely on softer and
more pervasive touches by government actors and private agents. Around
the core group of individuals who have been relegated to the nation's
prisons, there is a growing group of people who are neither in prison nor
fully free of its punitive and rights-limiting grasp. Like the noncitizen
slipping between undocumented and membership statuses, these individ-
uals have strangely indeterminate legal rights. They are regulated by civil
law regimes backed by the threat-but lacking the procedural protec-
tions-of criminal punishment. They must often pay to avoid banish-
ment. They are nominally free but subject to unusually high levels of
state monitoring and control. They are frequently limited in the exercise
of their citizenship rights, and they are vulnerable to capricious exercises
of discretionary authority and private discrimination and retaliation. Alt-
hough they are not identically situated to those with DACA and DAPA
status, they too experience a form of liminal legality.
As a result, the turn away from penal severity has not resulted in a
notable contraction of the criminal justice system. Although the number
of people in prisons is down,1 82
[T]he penal apparatus is quietly expanding. While state prison popu-
lations declined in 2012, jail populations went up. Supervisory pro-
grams like diversion, privatized probation, community supervision
Torture?, CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Feb. 25, 2013), http://cironline.org/reports/does-
22-12-hours-alone-8-1 0-cell-every-day-amount-torture-4225.
178. The U.S. Department of Justice National Former Prisoner Survey found that 10% of
inmates experienced sexual abuse in prison. ALLEN J. BECK & CANDACE JOHNSON, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION REPORTED BY FORMER STATE PRISONERS, 2008, at 8 (2008),
available at
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/MSNBC/Sections/NEWS/zPersonal/Huus/svrfspO8%5BI`%5D.pdf.
179. Felony Disenfranchisement, SENTENCING PROJECT,
http://www.sentencingproject.org/template/page.cfm?id=133 (last visited Mar. 22, 2015).
180. See, e.g., Hudson, 468 U.S. at 535 (finding that a prisoner has no right to privacy in his
prison cell). Prisoners are constitutionally protected from cruel and unusual punishment in prison,
but the bar is high, and courts give broad deference to prison officials in the administration of prison
facilities. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-86 (1987).
181. JONATHAN SIMON, MASS INCARCERATION ON TRIAL 155-60 (2014).
182. U.S. Prison Population Declines for Third Consecutive Year, supra note 167.
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and GPS monitoring are growth industries . . . . Defendants are on the
hook for an increasing array of fines and fees that can require years
to pay.1
The modem criminal justice system also relies upon an "increasing-
ly intrusive system of surveillance, social stratification, and behavioral
controls," including video cameras, crime records atabases, immigration
violator databases, DNA databases, sex offender registries, and other
amalgamations of data.'84 The effects of this pervasive and intrusive
monitoring extend well beyond individual defendants, reshaping lives at
the level of communities.'
At the same time, there are few formal checks on many of the grow-
ing intrusions into the lives of citizens in heavily policed communities.
Concerns about the inadequacies of the Fourth Amendment as a check on
governmental surveillance are common86 and are beginning to stir re-
newed interest among some justices of the Supreme Court. 87 But gov-
ernmental intrusions into spaces of informational privacy are far more
concerning when they operate in tandem with other exercises of govern-
mental control.'8 8 Ironically, the checks on governmental power are often
quite thin even when governmental intrusions are at their greatest. Gov-
ernment actors are increasingly relying on civil and administrative law
tools-backstopped by the criminal justice system-to maintain social
order. But just as criminal procedural protections are inapplicable in the
civil realm of immigration law, those same protections also do not extend
to other civil law regimes like parole, trespass laws, and civil gang in-
junctions. Unsurprisingly, these are the tools that federal, state, and local
governmental actors are increasingly using to regulate community mem-
bers. This shift toward practices that supplement criminal punishments
with more flexible regulatory regimes generates a new set of liminal le-
gal subjects.
Individuals on parole experience this problem firsthand and provide
perhaps the clearest example of liminal legality at the edges of the crimi-
nal justice system.189 Parole is often framed as "a defendant-friendly in-
183. Natapoff, supra note 169, at 1106-07 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
184. Id. at 1056.
185. Tonja Jacobi et al., The Attrition ofRights Under Parole, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 887, 889-90
(2014); Natapoff, supra note 169, at 1103.
186. David Alan Sklansky, Too Much Information: How Not to Think About Privacy and the
Fourth Amendment, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1069, 1087-88 (2014).
187. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484-85 (2014); United States v. Jones,
132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
188. Sklansky, supra note 186, at 1103, 1118 (exploring other forms of governmental intru-
sions).
189. David Sklansky has already noted the parallels between the interplay of immigration and
criminal law and the use of parole. He writes:
For the large and growing population of parolees, parole supervision functions as a paral-
lel enforcement track, with lower procedural hurdles but a set of available sanctions that
often (although far from always) will be less severe than the sanctions that would be trig-
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stitution"; it purportedly reduces prison time and aids offender reintegra-
tion in the community.190 Certainly, it is an improvement over incarcera-
tion in many respects; but it also generates liminal legality. Like their
counterparts in the immigration world, parolees must pay for the protec-
tions that the status can offer.191 Parolees also live on the razor's edge of
banishment, with little to no judicial process to stand between freedom
and prison. Parolees arrested on probable cause of parole violations can
be detained for up to three months pending a violations hearing and can
be reincarcerated for such offenses on a preponderance of the evidence
standard.
"[Elven if the parolee is only accused of a technical violation-for
instance, failing to attend meetings with a parole supervisor-he or
she can be subject to a longer term of incarceration than he was ini-
tially sentenced to serve. . . . [Including] beyond the maximum sen-
tence allowed for the initial crime.192
The wide net supposedly designed to allow more individuals to es-
cape incarceration ultimately results in more, not less, prison time for
some subset of those released.
The effects of these policies are not limited to individuals subject to
reincarceration. Because individuals on parole have little or no reasona-
ble expectation of privacy,193 their homes can be searched in the absence
of a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion-a fact that under-
gered by a new criminal conviction. That is to say that parole serves the same function
with respect to parolees that immigration law serves for noncitizens: a separate enforce-
ment track that low-level officials can elect to pursue, in lieu of normal criminal en-
forcement, when it appears convenient.
David Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV.
157, 207 (2012).
190. Jacobi et al., supra note 185, at 889-90.
191. Many criminal justice systems require parolees to pay "supervision fees" associated with
the costs of their freedom. See Paul Peterson, Supervision Fees: State Policies and Practice, 76 FED.
PROBATION 40, 40 (2012). For some examples of such fees, see, e.g., Cost of Supervision, IDAHO
DEP'T CORRECTIONS,
http://www.idoc.idaho.gov/content/probationandparole/offenderresources/cost-of upervision
(last visited Mar. 9, 2015) ("Any person under Idaho Department of Correction probation or parole
supervision shall be required to contribute not more than seventy-five dollars ($75.00) per month as
determined by the Board of Correction. The IDOC currently assesses a monthly fee of sixty dol-
lars ($60.00) per month."); Fees, WASH. COUNTY COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS,
http://www.co.washington.or.us/CommunityCorrections/fees/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2015) (describing
Washington County, Oregon supervision fees set at $35 per month); Frequently Asked Questions
About Community Resources, WIS. DEPARTMENT CORRECTIONS, http://doc.wi.gov/community-
resources/faq (last visited Mar. 9, 2015) (discussing, inter alia, supervision fees for probationers in
Wisconsin); Monitored Misdemeanor Program Fee Payments, MULTNOMAH COUNTY,
https://multco.us/dcj-adult/mmp/monitored-misdemeanor-program-fee-payments (lastvisited Mar. 9,
2015) (detailing monitoring fees in Multnomah County, Oregon); Probation and Parole Fee Pay-
ment System, ARK. COMMUNITY CORRECTION, https://www.ark.org/dcc/pmt/index.php (last visited
Mar. 9, 2015) (describing Arkansas Community Corrections supervision fees allowed for up to
$2000). This list is far from exclusive.
192. Jacobi et al., supra note 185, at 891.
193. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 847 (2006).
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mines the privacy of any individual living with a parolee.194 Indeed, pa-
role affects entire neighborhoods. One study of New York City found
that "not only do police stop more individuals in high parole density
neighborhoods, but . .. they then conduct significantly more searches
and arrests in those neighborhoods. The rates of frisks, however, are
lower in parolee-dense neighborhoods .... The authors read these
numbers to suggest that it is not just parolees who are being targeted for
full searches in the absence of justifying criminal suspicion, but non-
parolees in the neighborhood as well.1 9 6 In other words, entire neighbor-
hoods in parolee-dense areas are policed differently.197 Parole is trans-
formed into a "mechanism for the infectious degradation of community
rights."'98 In this regard, it is not only parolees who exist in a liminal
legal space; the rights of entire communities surrounding parolees expe-
rience the effects of liminal legality as well.
Because of racial disparities in the criminal justice system, African
Americans are overrepresented among parolees relative to their presence
in the general population, which means that the communities marked for
this type of policing are disproportionately African-American communi-
ties.199 The Supreme Court's decisions in cases like Atwater v. Lago
Vista,200 which allows for warrantless arrests for minor offenses that car-
201 202
ry no jail time, and Heien v. North Carolina, which upholds the va-
lidity of arrests based on the arresting officers' mistaken understanding
of the law, 203 increase the likelihood of arrests in these more heavily po-
liced areas while simultaneously decreasing the availability of remedies
for errors in arrests.
As a result of doctrinal developments that emerged during the war
on drugs era, arrests, in turn, often seem to be a virtual black hole of pro-
cedural rights. In escalating situations, police are allowed to use deadly
force to effectuate an arrest, even if the underlying conduct does not war-
rant incarceration, much less death.204 Arrests allow officials to conduct
dehumanizing and demeaning searches, including strip searches, as part
of standard booking procedures, and there is no redress for the resulting
violations of bodily integrity and dignity, even if these arrests are made
194. Jacobi et al., supra note 185, at 891.
195. Id. at 893.
196. Id. at 893-94.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 894.
199. Id. at 892.
200. 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
201. Id. at 354.
202. 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014).
203. Id. at 536.
204. Indeed, this is precisely the sequence of events that led to the deaths of Eric Garner and
Michael Brown in the Fall of 2014. See Ian Ayres & Daniel Markovits, Enforce the Law - Without
Force, WASH. POsT, Dec. 25, 2014, at A25 (describing the encounters and suggesting changes to the
"rules of engagement" governing arrest).
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in error.20 5 The more permissive stop, search, and arrest doctrines gov-
erning parolees can therefore create highly intrusive policing effects for
everyone in parole-dense communities, not just parolees. The communal
rights degradations generated by this interplay of criminal and civ-
il/administrative regulatory regimes are very like those experienced in
immigrant communities subjected to heighted immigration policing.206
Nor are parolees the only liminal legal subjects existing on the edg-
es of the criminal justice system. State and local actors throughout the
United States have demonstrated a creative ability to pair criminal justice
system mechanisms with novel civil law tools to regulate and limit the
movement of their residents in ways that actually mimic deportation.
"Increasing swaths of urban space are delimited as zones of exclusion
from which the undesirable are banned. The uniformed police are mar-
shaled to enforce and often delineate these boundaries; they use their
powers to monitor and arrest in an attempt to clear the streets of those
considered unsightly or 'disorderly."'
20 7
City officials rely on a hybrid combination of civil and criminal law
to achieve these banishments. In their study of policing practices in Seat-
tle, Katherine Beckett and Steve Herbert noted the proliferation of civil
law mechanisms that are used in conjunction with the criminal law to
keep individuals deemed undesirable out of certain physical spaces. One
such mechanism is a "Stay Out of Drug Areas (SODA) order[]," which
can be "imposed by judges as a condition of a sentence" but "may also
be issued by probation or community corrections officers as part of
community supervision."20 8 These orders require individuals to stay out
of certain designated areas. Another combined civil-criminal law mecha-
nism for enforcing spatial exclusion is the trespass admonishment. Mu-
nicipalities encourage property owners to authorize law enforcement to
determine who can be on their property. So empowered, law enforcement
can admonish people to remain off of the affected property and can be
punished with criminal law sanctions for their failure to comply. 209 Tres-
pass admonishment has become a pervasive and intrusive means of en-
forcing spatial exclusion in public housing areas across the country.210
Still another mechanism is the "off limits" order, which is imposed as a
205. Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1523 (2012). Individuals
identified as arrestable in databases, whether accurately or mistakenly, are indefinitely relegated to
liminal legal state. When their record triggers an arrest, there are no formal legal protections from
intrusive arrest procedures, even in hindsight. Id.
206. See discussion supra Part I.B.
207. KATHERINE BECKET & STEVE HERBERT, BANISHED: THE NEW SOCIAL CONTROL IN
URBAN AMERICA 8 (2010).
208. Id. at 4.
209. Id. at 7.
210. Id. at 8.
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condition of supervised release and which requires individuals to stay out
of certain, specified areas.211 As Beckett and Herbert have explained,
Many U.S. cities now deploy other new social control tools that in-
volve spatial exclusion and, like the innovations just described, fuse
civil and criminal law. These include gang injunctions, juvenile cur-
fews, and "no contact orders." Civil gang injunctions, widely used by
such California cities as Los Angeles, mobilize the civil power of the
injunction to address what is typically thought of as a crime problem
.... As is the case with trespass exclusions, a violation of these civil
orders is a criminal offense.212
Those who are subject to these exclusionary practices are separated
from family members and can lose access to important treatment and
employment opportunities. 213 Indeed, the life-altering consequences of
civil exclusions prompted Professors Beckett and Herbert to characterize
the experience as one of banishment.
Individuals in diversionary programs also experience liminal legali-
ty as a result of their legal regulation at the border of civil and criminal
legal regimes. For example, as jurisdictions decriminalize certain con-
duct, some people are able to escape imprisonment by paying fines. Be-
cause these fines can play a key role in funding the workings of munici-
pal government, there are perverse incentives on police officers to seek
out opportunities to gather them, even when such efforts themselves are
not supported by law.214 Moreover, the payment of a fine does not ex-
empt the payee from a host of punitive mechanisms that follow from
their putative criminality. These same individuals may experience private
denials of housing, credit, and jobs that flow from their marked records,
generating enduring forms of liminality. 215
The diversionary processes to which they submit can also render
some individuals quite vulnerable to a host of private actors. Private ac-
211. Id.at9.
212. Id. at 9 (footnotes omitted).
213. See id. at 4-7.
214. For outrageous-but surely not isolated-examples of this practice, see, for example, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS Div., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 4
(2015) [hereinafter FERGUSON REPORT], available at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/201 5/03/04/fergusonpolice departmentreport.pdf ("[Ferguson municipal]
court practices exacerbate the harm of Ferguson's unconstitutional police practices. They impose a
particular hardship upon Ferguson's most vulnerable residents, especially upon those living in or
near poverty. Minor offenses can generate crippling debts, result in jail time because of an inability
to pay, and result in the loss of a driver's license, employment, or housing.") The report also provid-
ed detailed examples of police officers giving citations for conduct that was not, in fact, a violation
of any law. Id. at 22. Racial animus has been an important, driving force in this unconstitutional
conduct. Id. at 4.
215. See Natapoff, supra note 169, at 1107 ("The collateral consequences of even a minor
conviction-from employment restrictions to housing, education and immigration-have become a
new and burdensome form of restraint and stigma.").
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tors engage in the collection of unpaid fines.216 Private actors also often
assess success in diversionary programs like drug treatment programs.217
And the state backs these private actors by holding out the threat of the
ultimate sanction of prison, even as the path to prison is strewn with few-
er procedural protections when compared to the traditional criminal pro-
cess.2 18 The resulting system visits its most severe consequences on eco-
nomically disadvantaged members of racial minority groups. Law en-
forcement officers can willfully target African Americans and other ra-
cial minority groups with these practices-and they have done so.2 19
Moreover, even where no overt racism is at work, the practices can have
disproportionately harsh effects on minorities because whites are more
likely to be able to pay, and program managers are more likely to deem
whites to have succeeded in diversionary programs than their non-white
counterparts.220 This means that racially disparate outcomes in new, al-
ternative sentencing schemes may be baked into the mix. 22 1
As in the case of the iconic liminal legal subjects, the role of private
actors is again important not just in shaping and implementing these new
regulatory mechanisms but also in extending them.222 Issa Kohler-
Hausmann's analysis of misdemeanor courts in New York shows that
criminal defendants will often plead to low level misdemeanors rather
than deal with the harassment of the multiple appearances that are re-
223 - - -quired to contest a criminal charge, just as immigrants with tenuous
legal statuses will sometimes take unfavorable pleas to escape the gov-
224ernmental monitoring associated with pretrial detention. Those indi-
viduals attempt to escape a process that is a punishment by pleading to
offenses that do not carry jail time.225 But once a plea is entered, individ-
uals continue to face a range of collateral consequences, quite often pri-
vately imposed, and they are also treated differently if they are brought
back into contact with the process again while still marked as a misde-
226meanant in their temporary records2. These liminal legal subjects are
216. Id. at 1085.
217. Id. at 1087.
218. Id. at 1095-96.
219. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 214, at 4.
220. See Natapoff, supra note 169, at 1096-97.
221. See id.
222. See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L.
REV. 611, 662 (2014); see also MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT:
HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 171-72 (1992).
223. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 222, at 666.
224. Cade, supra note 165, at 1776 ("Noncitizens placed under immigration detainers at book-
ing, or who fear ICE contact in pretrial detention, have a tremendous incentive to plead guilty as
quickly as possible in misdemeanor court, even to charges that trigger the possibility of additional
immigration consequences, and even if they are innocent or have been subject to unlawful police
practices.")
225. Cf FEELEY, supra note 222, at 30.
226. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 222, at 668-69; see also DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE,
CRIME AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION 144-47 (2007) (finding that crimi-
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therefore particularly vulnerable to punishments, formal and informal, by
public and private actors.227
In short, contemporary governance strategies to expand social con-
trol while simultaneously decreasing penal severity sometimes lead to
more diffuse, less visible, and less accountable forms of punishment.
These strategies generate new classes of individuals who now exist in a
fraught space of liminal legality.
D. Concluding Thoughts on the Production ofLiminality
The discussion above is not meant to exhaustively catalogue the
class of liminal legal subjects, but rather, to demonstrate that the concept
might be useful, not only for understanding the experiences of certain
unauthorized or temporarily authorized migrants, but lawful permanent
residents and citizens as well. The denizen on the edge of the criminal
justice system has many shared characteristics with noncitizens given
temporary reprieve from removal and with the citizens who are policed
more heavily because they bear the visible markers of race or ethnicity
that correlate to other forms of liminal legal status. Many individuals
experience overlapping vulnerabilities due to the combination of their
128race, religion, class and immigration status.
But even if shared features of liminal legality can be identified, and
even if one accepts that citizens and noncitizens alike experience forms
of liminal legality, what, if anything, can we learn from focusing atten-
tion on the liminal legal subject?
III. LEARNING FROM LIMINAL LEGALITY
In this final Part, I discuss some of the potential discursive and prac-
tical benefits of using the concept of liminal legality to frame discussions
concerning governance choices in regulation and policing. While the
treatment is not comprehensive, this Part does sketch out some of the
ways that a focus on liminal legality can benefit and deepen legal aca-
demic discourse. First, such a focus might generate more nuanced ac-
counts about the governance strategies involved in the creation and man-
agement of liminal legal subjects. Second, an analytical framework con-
structed around a shared concept of liminal legality might serve as means
of bringing inward-looking discussions concerning immigration regula-
tion, criminal justice, and other fields into more meaningful conversation
with one another. Finally, and much more tentatively, I suggest that a
focus on the concept of liminal legality might also offer the basis for a
nal records have a significant effect on an individual's employment prospects, and that the effect is
significantly more pronounced for African American men).
227. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 222, at 670; Natapoff, supra note 169, at 1089-90.
228. See generally GOLASH-BOZA, supra note 132, at 16-19; VAzquez, supra note 99, at 654-
56.
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theoretically coherent account of contemporary reform advocacy efforts
that deemphasize the rights of formal legal citizenship as the focal point
of rights discourse.
A. Liminal Legal Subjects and "The State"
Scholars who have closely studied the lived experience of those
with liminal legality have provided a rich account of the impact of such
status on the lives of its bearers. Those accounts can be very helpful to
anyone seeking to understand the individual and community-level conse-
quences of particular governance strategies. But these accounts could
also be used as the starting point for deeper exploration of how state
power operates in the production and regulation of liminal legality.
Sociological accounts theorize that the creation of liminal legal cat-
egories "brings to the fore the continued power of the nation-state."229 In
this framing, the state's role in generating liminal legal status for nonciti-
zens is just one part of a broader trend toward greater consolidation of
state power vis-a-vis would-be entrants-and would-be citizens-
through tightened access to entry and to citizenship.230 At a time when
the cross-border movement is more possible, and more common, than
ever before, states find new ways to assert their power through tightened
barriers to entry and more tightly controlled access to both citizenship
and the benefits that citizenship bestows.231 Simply put, the existing
scholarship on liminal legality posits that through the creation of liminal
legal subjects, the state is strengthened vis-A-vis its subjects.
By concretizing how liminal legality relates to law and legal status,
scholars might begin to offer more detailed and nuanced accounts about
how liminal legality is produced by and shapes governance. Among oth-
er things, this will require a disaggregation of state actors. Different gov-
ernmental actors are empowered and disempowered in the governance of
individuals with liminal legal statuses, and the transformative effect on
state actors is both more complex and more profound than a mere
strengthening of state power vis-A-vis noncitizens. Understanding these
dynamics is far more difficult than an analysis that presumes the exist-
ence of a monolithic state responsible for governing its diverse popula-
229. Menjivar, supra note 2, at 1004.
230. See, e.g., Irene Bloemraad, Who Claims Dual Citizenship? The Limits ofPostnationalism,
the Possibilities of Transnationalism, and the Persistence of Traditional Citizenship, 38 INT'L
MIGRATION REv. 389, 389-90 (2004); see also MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW,
supra note 165, at 98 (noting that the passage of immigration-related legislation in 1996 has in-
creased the vulnerability of lawful permanent residents and hardened what had previously been a
softer citizen-resident line). But see Peter J. Spiro, The (Dwindling) Rights and Obligations of Citi-
zenship, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 899, 900 (2013) (arguing that "[flew important rights hinge
on citizenship status").




tions. Using affected liminal populations as the starting point for anal-
yses of governance strategies allows for more accurate accounts of how
various governing bodies share power among themselves in the regula-
tion of particular populations.
One can look to the creation of the DACA and DAPA programs as
one example of how this focus aids in the analysis of regulations aimed
at liminal legal subjects. When evaluating the DACA and DAPA pro-
grams, many scholars and commentators have argued that the federal
Executive Branch is strengthened (or perhaps even aggrandized) not on-
ly, or even primarily, as against its liminal legal subjects, but also as
against the federal Legislature and state governments.233 In this narrative,
executive agencies exercise power that exceeds that delegated by Con-
gress's enforcement scheme and that is denied to both Immigration Judg-
es housed within the Department of Justice and Article III courts. This
aggrandizement happens at the expense of the diminished federal legisla-
ture and judiciary, but also at the expense of states, since the states bear
some of the burdens of implementing the program.234 Such a story of
executive empowerment could be told about many of the rising liminal
classes, and the entire subject could be chalked up to insufficient checks
on executive power with the rise of the administrative state.
On the other hand, the experience of liminal legal subjects that were
the focus of the DACA and DAPA programs expose the inadequacy of
this account. These programs formalize (or would formalize, in the case
of DAPA) exercises of prosecutorial discretion expressly and impliedly
delegated by Congress to the Executive branch in an area where the Ex-
ecutive actually has quite expansive powers.235 In fact, the aggrandize-
ment of USCIS at the expense of other political actors is not the best
account of the DACA and DAPA programs at all. This is quite evident
when one focuses not on the content of the OLC memo that provides the
legal justification for the programs, or on the statements of various offi-
cials in support of the program, but rather, on the liminal legal subjects
who dwell within the potential protective scope of DACA and DAPA.
Shifting the focus in that direction immediately begs the important ques-
tion of why the programs were needed at all. After all, these liminal legal
232. Accordingly, some sociologists are already beginning to explore the different roles of the
multiplicity of state actors engaged in the production and maintenance of liminal legality. See, e.g.,
Abrego & Lakhani, supra note 3, at 274-77.
233. This is the essence of the lawsuits challenging the program that were filed by twenty-six
states and also by certain members of Congress. See Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591,
613-18 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
234. Id at 22-23.
235. On the power of the Executive under current immigration law, see Adam B. Cox & Cris-
tina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE LJ. 458 (2009).
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subjects were not priorities for removal.236 Why not just continue to leave
them alone?
Focusing on the experiences of liminal legal subjects in the lead-up
to the program rollout provides the answer. It was well known in immi-
grant communities and among immigrant-serving organizations that,
although elected officials repeatedly set enforcement priorities in the
immigration sphere,23 7 those efforts were often undercut by low-level
federal officials and, at times, by state and local law enforcement.
Throughout the country, noncitizens who apparently fit into the low en-
forcement priority categories were being picked up by ICE or funneled to
ICE by state and local officials and then placed in removal proceedings.
Against this backdrop, DACA and DAPA can be properly under-
stood not as tools designed to disempower Congress but as programs
designed to operate as a check on an "insurrection"23 8 by lower-level ICE
agents who had repeatedly declined to fall in line with the commands of
elected officials.239 These programs constitute an effort to reestablish
democratic control over a recalcitrant police force with tremendous pow-
er over the lives of liminal legal populations.
Furthermore, the programs reasserted federal enforcement priorities
in a way that supplanted some lower-level public and private immigra-
tion sorting by actors who might otherwise be able to exploit the particu-
lar legal vulnerabilities of removable noncitizens. The development of a
program that triggered statutory driver's license authorization240 and em-
ployment authorization241 made no change to the existing legal frame-
work. It did, however, empower liminal legal subjects vis-A-vis local
police officers who might use driving violations as a means of reordering
242federal immigration enforcement priorities and private employers who
236. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (discussing the Morton memo in particular
and the historical expansion of enforcement priorities more generally).
237. See supra note 62 (cataloguing the various enforcement priority memos issued over the
last twenty years).
238. Ahilan Arulanantham, The President 's Relief Program as a Response to Insurrection,
BALKINIZATION (Nov. 25, 2014, 5:00 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/1 /the-presidents-relief-
program-as.html ("Although you will not find it discussed either in the administration's public
statements or in its OLC memo, the new administrative relief program arises out of a historical
context of defiance - some would say insurrection - by ICE enforcement agents and attorneys who
essentially refused to implement prior directives on prosecutorial priorities.").
239. Id.; see also Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244, 248-49, 255 (5th Cir. 2015) (dismissing a
lawsuit by ICE agents and several state officials challenging the Obama administration's DACA
program).
240. See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror,
and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 202(c)(2)(B), 119 Stat. 231 (2005).
241. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 274A, 100 Stat.
3359.
242. There is evidence that some jurisdictions targeted immigrant neighborhoods for height-
ened surveillance and traffic stops and that unauthorized immigrants' lack of driver's licenses left
individuals vulnerable to criminal consequences and left communities vulnerable to enforcement
efforts explicitly premised on national origin discrimination.
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might otherwise exploit the vulnerabilities of unauthorized members of
the workforce.243
Examining the program through the lens of its effects on liminal le-
gal communities also reveals the extent to which executive choices are
still heavily constrained by federalism in this context. Individual exercis-
es of discretion by state and local law enforcement agents take on out-
sized significance in the shaping of immigration law on the ground,24
even as the program aims to quell such discretionary excesses on the part
of line ICE agents. Within this framework, private actors also gain new
forms of power in shaping the contours of eligibility for discretionary
relief, both by providing input that shapes the administrative rules that
govern discretionary relief and by performing a screening function in
determining which individual applicants seeking access to temporary
legal status are actually worthy of relief.24 5 Pervasive anti-immigrant
messages by both public and private actors can also affect state actors at
all levels of government in ways that effectively obliterate the protec-
tions purportedly provided by federal law. In this way, anti-immigrant
rhetoric sometimes has a greater effect on how noncitizens experience
the law than does the complex and convoluted federal regulatory system
that controls their formal legal status.246
The same sorts of complexities might be teased out when examining
the legal mechanisms that affect the governance of other liminal popula-
24tions.247 The effects of liminal legality on the power of the state, and the
role of the state in creating and controlling liminal legal subjects, re-
quires much more fleshing out. Identifying liminal legal populations and
using their experiences as the starting point for such analyses can illumi-
nate features of governmental power distributions that get lost in ac-
counts that ignore lived experience.
B. Liminal Legal Subjects Outside of "Exceptional" Immigration Law
Broadening the concept of liminal legality also provides a way to
avoid unproductive treatment of the field of immigration law as an ex-
ceptional domain with little relevance outside of its limited sphere. Im-
migration law is often treated as standing uniquely outside of the realm
of constitutional review248 and, therefore, incomparable with other sub-
243. See Juarez v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 69 F. Supp. 3d 364, 365-66 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (apply-
ing IRCA's antidiscrimination protections to noncitizens seeking work with DACA-related EADs);
see also discussion supra note 73 (discussing evidence of employer exploitation of unauthorized
workers).
244. Motomura, supra note 84, at 1821-22.
245. See id.
246. See Abrego & Lakhani, supra note 3, at 277.
247. See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 5-6 (2013)
(critiquing the intragovernmental distribution of power in the criminal justice system).
248. For an early articulation of the notion of immigration exceptionalism, see generally Mo-
tomura, supra note 134, at 1363.
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stantive areas of law. While claims of exceptionalism have a doctrinal
basis, the exceptionality is often less than meets the eye.249 Illuminating
the shared liminal legality of groups both within and outside of various
enforcement systems can lead to a better understanding of the common
experiences of certain noncitizens and citizens. It pushes against the re-
flective notion that the rights deprivations experienced by noncitizens are
a simple and direct result of their formal citizenship status. Citizens and
noncitizens experience declining legal protections in the wake of the
expansion of immigration enforcement, and citizens and noncitizens are
affected by similar transformations in the criminal justice system. Some-
times the rights deprivations operate in complimentary ways on popula-
tions situated at the intersection of the system, but sometimes the results
are more subtle. Less protective Fourth Amendment law in the area of
immigration policing has frequently migrated into the core of constitu-
tional doctrine without regard to the citizenship status of the policed
populations, to take just one example.250 Similarly, governmental reli-
ance on the interplay of civil and criminal punitive mechanisms as a
means of effectuating social control is not limited to a crimmigration
system.
At academic institutions from the lowlands of Leiden in the Nether-
landS25 1 to the Mile High City in the Rocky Mountains252 and beyond ,253
249. There is not really a consensus on the extent to which immigration law actually is consti-
tutionally exceptional. Compare Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative
Apology and Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 257 (2000), with Kevin R. Johnson, Race and Immigration Law and En-
forcement: A Response to Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine?, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 289, 290-92
(2000), and Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Exceptionalism: Commentary on Is There a Plenary
Powers Doctrine?, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 307, 307 (2000).
250. See Jennifer M. Chac6n, Border Exceptionalism in the Era of Moving Borders, 38
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 129, 145 (2010); see also Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl 1. Harris, Undocument-
ed Criminal Procedure, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1543, 1547-50 (2011).
251. Leiden University hosted a Crimmigration conference in October 2014.
252. The University of Denver's Sturm College of Law hosted a CrImmigration symposium in
February 2015.
253. Numerous law schools now offer courses that are explicitly styled as crimmigration
courses, including Harvard Law School. See, e.g., Crimmigration: The Intersection of Criminal Law
and Immigration Law, HARV. L. SCH.,
http://hls.harvard.edulacademics/curriculum/catalog/index.html?o=67538 (last visited Mar. 7, 2015)
(course description); Crimmigration: The Intersection of Immigration and Criminal Law and Proce-
dure, U. CINCINNATI C.L., http://law.uc.edu/sites/default/files/CrimmigrationsyllabusF2014-rev-8-8-
14-Vazquez.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2015) (course description); Crimmigration, U. Hous. L.
CENTER, http://www.law.uh.edu/schedule/class-information.asp?cid=12623 (last visited Mar. 7,
2015) (course description); Crimmigration Legal Theory and Practice: Strategies and Solutions for
Non-citizens Charged With Crimes, U. MD. SCH. L.,
https://www.law.umaryland.edulacademics/program/curriculum/catalog/course_details.html?coursen
um=549T (last visited Mar. 7, 2015) (course description). This is not an exhaustive list. Indeed, the
Society of American Law Teachers recently offered a panel on the topic of teaching crimmigration
law. See Society of American Law Teachers, Legal Education in a Time of Change: Challenges &
Opportunities, SALT LAW 12-13 (2014), available at https://www.saltlaw.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/2014-SALT-Teaching-Conference-and-SALT-LatCrit-FDW-Program-
OCT-9-1 1.pdf. Many other institutions have classes that focus on issues of the criminalization of
civil immigration proceedings or on the topic of non-citizens in the criminal justice system, although
they do not adopt the crimmigration label.
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the umbrella concept of crimmigration has been used to organize a wide-
ranging academic discourse dedicated to exploring domestic and interna-
tional developments at the intersection of criminal and immigration law.
This framing has advantages as well as disadvantages.
On the positive side, the crimmigration rubric has been useful for
thinking about the specific moments of procedural intersection between
the criminal and immigration enforcement systems. These moments oc-
cur frequently because the immigration system and the criminal justice
system actually intersect in a number of significant ways. A pipeline
connects the criminal justice system and the removal system. The crimi-
nal justice system has become an important entry point for removal, par-
ticularly with the rollout of the Secure Communities program, which
required state and local law enforcement to check arrestee data against a
federal immigration database.2 54 Although that particular program has
been rolled back in recent months, it has not been eliminated.255 The
government will continue to use this screening function in a limited way
through the so-called Priority Enforcement Program (PEP) and many
criminal arrestees will continue to be funneled into the removal system in
this way. 256 The long-standing Criminal Alien Program (CAP) continues
- * * *257
to ensure immigration screening in prisons and jails. Despite questions
about their legality,258 the federal government also continues to issue, and
some jurisdictions continue to honor, immigration detainers to hold per-
sons of interest to immigration officials beyond the time required to pro-
cess their state criminal matters.259 All of these programs generate far-
254. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.ice.gov/secure-communities (last visited Mar. 7, 2015). For a discussion of critiques of
the program, see infra note 265.
255. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., to Thomas
S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, et al., 2 (Nov. 20, 2014)
[hereinafter Johnson Memorandum Il]
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120 memo prosecutorialdiscretion.pdf
(directing ICE to continue to screen state and local arrests, but to "only seek transfer of the alien"
from state and local custody when that noncitizen fits one of DHS's high priority categories for
removal).
The rollback of the Secure Communities may narrow the size of the arrest-to-deportation
pipeline, the continuation of arrest screening through ICE's Priority Enforcement Program (PEP)
ensures the continued flow of some noncitizen from arrest to deportation. Immigrants' rights organi-
zations have taken to calling the new program PEP-Comm, to draw attention to its continuities with
the more expansive S-Comm program. See, e.g., Press Release, California Immigrant Policy Center,
Civil Rights Orgs Celebrate the End of S-Comm, Caution Against the Replacement "PEP-Comm"
Program (Nov. 21, 2014), available at http://www.caimmigrant.org/groups-celebrate-s-comm-end/.
256. Johnson Memorandum II, supra note 255, at 1-3.
257. Criminal Alien Program, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.ice.gov/criminal-alien-program (last visited Mar. 13, 2015).
258. Lasch, Detainer Enforcement, supra note 165, at 283-84; CHRISTOPHER LASCH, IMMIGR.
POL'Y CENTER, THE FAULTY LEGAL ARGUMENTS BEHIND IMMIGRATION DETAINERS 2, 4-7 (2013),
available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/laschon-detainers.pdf; see
also Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cnty., No. 3:12-CV-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *4-11
(D. Or. Apr. I1, 2014) (finding holds executed pursuant to an ICE request lacked basis in law and
constituted a Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure).
259. See Tim Henderson, More Jurisdictions Defying Feds on Deporting Immigrants, PEW
CHARITABLE TR. (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
7592015]
760 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:4
reaching practical and procedural connections between the criminal and
immigration systems.
The outputs of the criminal justice system are also taken into ac-
count in the substantive application of immigration law. The Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) imposes significant immigration consequenc-
es on a broad range of criminal convictions and activity, including for
conduct associated with extremely minor criminal offenses.2 60 The Su-
preme Court has recognized the reality of this interplay26 1 and has con-
cluded that to even be effective in the criminal justice system, advocates
for noncitizens in criminal courts must be aware of their client's immi-
gration status and advise them of the clear immigration consequences of
their criminal offenses.262
By looking at the particular spaces of intersection between criminal
and immigration law, scholars working at that intersection have paved
the way for important policy interventions that have sometimes mitigated
the most problematic manifestations of the systemic interplay of these
two bodies of law. For example, scholars working at the criminal and
immigration law intersection have developed successful challenges to the
widespread, and unlawful, reliance by states and localities on federally-
analysis/blogs/stateline/2014/10/31/more-jurisdictions-defying-feds-on-deporting-immigrants ( ot-
ing that, as of the date of the report, half of all noncitizens live in jurisdictions that declined to honor
ICE detainers).
260. See Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 212(a)(2), 236(c), 8 U.S.C. §§ I182(a)(2),
1226(c) (2015) (setting forth broad grounds for expulsion or exclusion on grounds of criminal viola-
tions and drug-related conduct); HING, supra note 165, at 4-7 (describing cases of sympathetic
noncitizens removed under expansive removal provisions); JOHNSON, supra note 114, at 7-8, 111-
12, 114-15 (describing the transformation of the immigration laws and their sweeping effects);
KANSTROOM, supra note 5, at 14-15, 243-46 (describing the expansive removal provisions and their
harsh effects); Hing, supra note 62, at 497-98 (discussing cases where noncitizens were removed
because of minor criminal infractions); Morawetz, supra note 164, at 166-67 (noting the harsh
effects of the nation's drug removal provisions).
261. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 363-64 (2010). In Padilla, Justice Stevens wrote for
the majority:
Under contemporary law, if a noncitizen has committed a removable offense after the
1996 effective date of these amendments, his removal is practically inevitable but for the
possible exercise of limited remnants of equitable discretion vested in the Attorney Gen-
eral to cancel removal for noncitizens convicted of particular classes of offenses. Subject
to limited exceptions, this discretionary relief is not available for an offense related to
trafficking in a controlled substance.
These changes to our immigration law have dramatically raised the stakes of a nonciti-
zen's criminal conviction. The importance of accurate legal advice for noncitizens ac-
cused of crimes has never been more important. These changes confirm our view that, as
a matter of federal law, deportation is an integral part-indeed, sometimes the most im-
portant part-of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead
guilty to specified crimes.
Id. (citations omitted).
262. Id. at 368-69, 374. For discussions concerning the specific meaning and content of Pa-
dilla's requirements, see, for example, C6sar Cuauhtimoc Garcia Hemndez, Criminal Defense after
Padilla v. Kentucky, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 475, 487-88 (2012); Christopher N. Lasch, Redress in
State Postconviction Proceedings for Ineffective Crimmigration Counsel, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 959,
971-75 (2014); Yolanda Vdzquez, Realizing Padilla's Promise: Ensuring Noncitizen Defendants Are
Advised of the Immigration Consequences ofa Criminal Conviction, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 169,
172-73, 187-92 (2011).
PRODUCING LIMINAL LEGALITY
issued immigration detainers as the justification for holding noncitizens
past the period warranted under state law.263 The Supreme Court's deci-
sion to require counsel to advise noncitizens of the clear immigration
consequences of criminal convictions flows directly out of this work as
well.264 And scholarship and advocacy interrogating the efficacy and
fairness of the Secure Communities program were essential to effectuat-
ing the November 2014 rollback of the program.265 Ultimately, the sus-
tained and particularized analyses of specific interactions between the
criminal and immigration law systems have been transformative on the
ground.
On the other hand, there are downsides to the crimmigration frame-
work, too. First, it is often asked to support more weight than it should
bear. The assumption of the existence of an emerging crimmigration
system suggests both more novelty and more coherence in the interplay
of criminal and immigration law than actually exists. Some of the most
severe outcomes that arise at the intersection of the criminal and immi-
gration system arise not because the systems work together but because
they operate in ignorance of one another. With much of the emerging
literature on the criminal-immigration law nexus focusing (understanda-
bly) on points of convergence, it is worth remembering that both theoret-
ically and practically the immigration and criminal law systems also re-
tain their distinctive logics and domains.
It is true, for example, that different federal, state, and local gov-
ernment actors can leverage one system when the other does not seem
likely to give the actor the result she seeks in a particular case and that
266
the interplay between these systems can be potent. But it is also the
case that some of the most egregious harms wrought by criminal justice
actors in immigration courts are imposed inadvertently. They are caused
263. For examples of scholarly challenges to the legality of detainers, see, for example, Lasch,
Detainer Enforcement, supra note 165, at 291, 293-94, 313. For a successful challenge see, for
example, Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cnty., No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *4-
11 (D. Or. Apr. I1, 2014). The Miranda-Olivares case generated a cascade of jurisdictions unwilling
to enforce detainers. Andrea Castillo, Washington, Colorado Counties Join Oregon in No Longer
Complying with Immigration Detainers, OREGONIAN (May 1, 2014),
http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-
news/index.ssf/2014/05/washington coloradocountiesj.html ("At least four counties in Washing-
ton state and four in Colorado have joined a growing number of jurisdictions in Oregon that stopped
holding undocumented immigrants in jail for the sole purpose of deportation.").
264. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 367 (citing numerous scholars in concluding that "[t]he weight of
prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client regarding the
risk of deportation").
265. Influential criticisms included Cox & Miles, supra note 163, at 132-35; AARTI KOHLI ET
AL., THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INSTITUTE ON LAW & SOC. POLICY, SECURE COMMUNITIES
BY THE NUMBERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE PROCESS 1-4, 13 (2011), available
at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Secure Communities by the Numbers.pdf; Thomas J. Miles
& Adam B. Cox, Does Immigration Enforcement Reduce Crime? Evidence from Secure Communi-
ties, 57 J.L. & ECON. 937, 969-70 (2014).
266. See, e.g., Chac6n, A Diversion, supra note 134, at 1567-69, 1615-20; Eagly, Prosecuting
Immigration, supra note 165, at 1285-86, 1339; Sklansky, supra note 189, at 163-64, 201-02.
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by judges and juries who sentenced LPR defendants for crimes that later
became deportable offenses under immigration law, but are not deporta-
ble offenses at the time of sentencing. Or lawyers who structured plea
agreements around existing law without the superhuman ability to fore-
cast shifting interpretations of immigration law. Or lawyers who struc-
tured bad pleas because they simply didn't understand immigration law
at all. Or beat officers who conducted domestic violence arrests to secure
a temporary peace without recognizing (and even without wanting) the
deportation screening that the arrest could trigger. Or a school official
who calls the police to mediate a school fight without understanding the
immigration consequences uch a call might have for an undocumented
student or his family-both now, and in terms of future eligibility for
relief-should intervening officials decide that there is a gang element to
267
the activities.
In daily practice, governmental actors at all levels may seek to
avoid immigration consequences or facilitate them, but they will often
undertake their specific actions in the realm of criminal justice with an
imperfect understanding of how they will affect immigration proceed-
ings. Indeed, at the formal level, Congress and the courts have done a
great deal of work to keep the criminal justice system out of immigration
courts at critical junctures. While at one time the criminal sentencing
court had the potential to play an active role in deportation decisions
through the issuance of a Judicial Recommendation Against Deportation
(JRAD), that power was eliminated by Congress in 1990.268 The criminal
sentencing judge now has no role in preventing the deportation of noncit-
izens placed in removal proceedings for criminal convictions. Similarly,
much of the evidence available to criminal courts in the plea bargaining
process are deliberately (and largely for good reason) screened out of
immigration proceedings by the categorical and modified categorical
approaches that courts apply in determining the immigration conse-
quences of certain kinds of criminal offenses.269
267. For this last point, see Jennifer M. Chac6n, Students and the Deportation Machine at 13
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
268. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 363 (2010). The JRAD was always controversial and
never very systematically implemented, but it did have certain advantages, including allowing the
judge with the broadest understanding of the criminal conduct at issue and the equities at issue to
make a determination on the extent to which the individual's conduct warranted the application of
immigration consequences. Id.; see also Taylor & Wright, supra note 165, at 1143-44 (discussing
the sentencing judge's discretion to deport or not deport an offender).
269. For applications of the doctrine in immigration cases, see Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct.
1678, 1684-87 (2013); Kawashima v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1166, 1172 (2012); Carachuri-Rosendo v.
Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 580-82 (2010); Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 35-38, 41 (2009); Gonzales
v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 187 (2007); Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 50-52, 58, 60
(2006); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 4-7 (2004). For justifications, see Alina Das, The Immigra-
tion Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting Categorical Analysis in Immigration Law, 86
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1705-07, 1746-58 (2011) (arguing in support of the categorical approach on
historical and policy grounds); Jennifer Lee Koh, The Whole Better than the Sum: A Case for the
Categorical Approach to Determining the Immigration Consequences of Crime, 26 GEO. IMMIGR.
762 [Vol. 92:4
PRODUCING LIMINAL LEGALITY
Suggestions of a coherent crimmigration system thus run the risk of
oversimplifying the nature of the relationship between the criminal and
immigration law systems. It may also lead to inadvertent overstatement
about the novelty of the systemic interplay at stake; in fact, when it
comes to reliance on criminal law actors to effectuate immigration en-
forcement goals, historical roots run deep.270 At the same time, in focus-
ing attention on the evolution of a new system, the crimmigration
framework may skew attention away from the commonalities that the
criminal-immigration law interactions have with other criminal-civil law
interplay. Just as overstated notions of immigration exceptionalism can
skew attention away from systemic legal developments that affect citi-
zens, crimmigration scholarship may at times perpetuate a notion that no
other populations are regulated in quite the same way as individuals
caught in the intersection of the criminal justice and immigration en-
forcement systems.
As the foregoing analysis suggests, liminal legal statuses are not
borne solely by noncitizens. Inside and outside the immigration sphere,
the proliferation of liminal legal statuses functions imultaneously as a
means of effectuating administrative resource conservation through
27 1community-oriented risk-management strategies and as a form of
"preservation through transformation,"2 72 allowing governmental actors
to reassert and maintain shifting forms of control over racialized and
otherwise marginalized populations identified as high risk in ways that
do not trigger the rights-protective schemes that evolved in the post-war
era in both domestic and international law. "Crimmigration" serves as a
shorthand explanation of how this occurs in the area of immigration law,
but it is not always an accurate shorthand explanation. In conjuring up
the notion of a system designed to manage a discrete class of alien law-
L.J. 257, 264-65, 299-300 (2012) (arguing in support of the categorical approach on historical and
policy grounds).
270. Rachel E. Rosenblum, Policing Sex, Policing Immigrants: What Crimmigration's Past
Can Tell Us about It's Present and Future, 104 CAL. L. REV. 101, 102, 104 (forthcoming 2016); see
also FRANCISCO E. BALDERRAMA & RAYMOND RODRIGUEZ, DECADE OF BETRAYAL 120-21 (rev.
ed. 2006) (discussing the leading role played by local officials in the so-called "repatriation" of
Mexicans and Mexican-Americans to Mexico in the 1930s); JUAN RAMON GARCiA, OPERATION
WETBACK: THE MASS DEPORTATION OF MEXICAN UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN 1954, at 191
(1980) (discussing the important, and sometimes overly-aggressive, participation of California state
and local officials in implementing the infamous immigration enforcement sweep of the 1950s).
271. For analyses that identify the risk-assessment heories undergirding the approaches, see,
for example, JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 4-6 (2009) (discussing
the shifting perspective of the American society from "governing crime" to "governing through
crime"); Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 222, at 616-17 (analyzing the process of misdemeanor
adjudication in New York criminal courts as one that marks and monitors its subjects as potential
risks); Mark Noferi & Robert Koulish, The Immigration Detention Risk Assessment, 29 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 45, 48-50 (2015) (critiquing ICE's risk assessment tools for immigration detention and
noting accompanying danger of the expansive reliance on risk assessment logics to justify more
extensive and widespread monitoring of noncitizens).
272. See Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117, 2119 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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breakers, it may also be a stigmatizing one. Framing the discourse
around liminal legality could operate to check unjustifiable presumptions
of immigration law exceptionality and encourage efforts to identify the
common regulatory methods that have generated a transubstantive nor-
malization of liminality. 27 3 Shifting the focus to liminal legality may, in
fact, open up a path to return crimmigration scholarship to its deeper
theoretical grounding in membership theory,274 thereby reinvigorating the
discussion of the role that race, religion, class, and place play in structur-
ing governance strategies at the border of criminal and immigration
aw.275
C. Liminal Legality and Lawyering for Change
Finally, and relatedly, a more robust understanding of the features
of liminal legality might allow for the development of new accounts of
the social change strategies geared toward generating greater legal pro-
tection and increased stability in the lives of liminal legal subjects. Activ-
ists seeking to expand the rights of noncitizens in the United States have
long worked against the backdrop of skeletal, formal constitutional pro-
tections.276 In this context, rights protection has required leveraging doc-
trines designed to protect other populations or institutional interests,2 77 as
well as engagement in political acts that assert previously unacknowl-
273. For work in this vein, see, e.g., Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809,
844-46 (2015); Kalhan, Immigration Policing, supra note 165, at 1162-64; Sklansky, supra note
189, at 219-23.
274. Stumpf, supra note 165, at 376. In her article, Stumpf uses the phrase "criminalization of
immigration law" and "crimmigration" interchangeably, and uses both to describe the "merger" or
"convergence" of criminal and immigration law. See id She offers an account of a "crimmigration"
merger that has evolved "on three fronts: (1) the substance of immigration law and criminal law
increasingly overlaps, (2) immigration enforcement has come to resemble criminal law enforcement,
and (3) the procedural aspects of prosecuting immigration violations have taken on many of the
earmarks of criminal procedure." Id. at 381. After charting these developments, Stumpf offers
membership theory as an explanatory basis for understanding why these systems increasingly appear
similar in their justifications and procedural mechanisms. See id. at 376.
275. For a recent critique of crimmigration scholarship as insufficiently focused on questions
of race, see Kevin R. Johnson, Race-Based Low Enforcement: The Racially Disparate Impacts of
Crimmigration Law, (forthcoming) (on file with author). For a defense of use of the crimmigration
framework specifically because it facilitates a focus on governance strategies deliberately and differ-
entially aimed at Latinos in the United States see Vazquez, supra note 99, at 609-11; Garcia Her-
nndez, Creating Crimmigration, supra note 165, at 1459. 1 agree with these authors about the
racialized effects of the interplay of immigration and criminal law strategies. But with my discussion
here, I hope to show why I think those developments are not simply an analogue to the phenomenon
of mass incarceration in African American communities. The governance strategies are, in important
ways, the same legal strategies.
276. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS,
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 13-15, 52 (1996).
277. See MOTOMURA, supra note 165, at 7-8, 114-15, 117-18, 132-35, 138-41 (explaining
the ways that preemption claims, equal protection claims of citizens, and procedural due process
claims have all operated as means of effectuating the legal rights of noncitizens, including the un-
documented); see also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 560-65 (1990)
(discussing the role of "phantom norms" in generating rights protective developments in immigra-




edged rights into existence.28 Advocacy in the areas of national security
and immigration regulation have indeed transformed legal doctrine that
is generally viewed as rights-restrictive into vehicles for increased indi-
vidual rights vis-i-vis federal legislative and executive administrative
agencies.279 Lessons from this area likely have broader application for
liminal legal populations.
When you start from the premise that the political branches have an
all but absolute right to expel noncitizens and that broad deference is due
to prison administrators, it should probably go without saying that there
is no right for a noncitizen to be free of immigration screening in a jail;
and yet community activism at one time ended the screening of Rikers
inmates by ICE officials previously housed on the premises.2 80 More
broadly, such activism resulted in the narrowing of the Secure Communi-
ties program.281 Similarly, under a constitutional doctrine that affords
virtually no substantive effect to time spent in the country when deter-
mining the right to remain, it is impossible to locate a right for unauthor-
ized migrant youth to remain in the United States on the basis of their
time here and their good character. Yet, community activism changed the
legal structure to afford a version of this protection, and continued activ-
ism may well transform that more liminal status into something more
protective and permanent.
While a good deal of immigrants' rights activism focuses on the
vindication of formal legal rights,282 rights still often have to be willed
into existence through concerted legal activism that focuses on appeals to
278. Peter L. Markowitz, Remarks at the Denver University Law Review Crimmigration Sym-
posium (Feb. 2, 2015), available at http://du-
denverlaw.hosted.panopto.com/Panopto/Pages/Viewer.aspx?id=93a85392-078a-414e-84bd-
5607b4fb08d3.
279. See, e.g., Joseph Landau, Due Process and the Non-Citizen: A Revolution Reconsidered,
47 CONN. L. REV. 879, 882-84 (2015) (arguing that litigants and courts have used the Mathews v.
Eldridge test to generate judicial due process protections in immigration and national security cases,
which have traditionally been unyielding to individual interests); see also Peter H. Schuck,
Kleindeinst v. Mandel: Plenary Power v. the Professors, in IMMIGRATION STORIES (Peter H. Schuck
& David A. Martin eds., 2005) (discussing the role of litigants in turning the seemingly unprotective
Kleindeinst v. Mandel requirement for a "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" to justify the
imposing certain exclusion bars to noncitizens into a meaningful, substantive check on ideological
exclusion).
280. This Valentine 's Day, Celebrate the Best Breakup Ever: ICE out of Rikers, IMMIGRANT
DEF. PROJECT (Feb. 13, 2015), http://immigrantdefenseproject.org/valentines-day-celebrate-best-
breakup-ever-ice-rikers.
281. See supra notes 263-65, 292 and accompanying text.
282. See R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 170-73, 189-91 (D.D.C. 2015) (granting a
preliminary injunction against denying bond on national security grounds for Central American
migrants); Complaint at 2, 5, 21-24, 26, Chacon v. E. Haven Police Dep't, No. 3:10-CV-1692-JBA
(D. Conn. Oct. 26, 2010) (D. Conn. Oct. 26, 2010) (alleging a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action for
damages, the parties eventually settled on July 17, 2014); Mora v. Arpaio, No. CV-09-1719-PHX-
DGC, 2009 WL 3488718, at *1-2 (D. Ariz. Oct. 28, 2009) (holding that plaintiffs could proceed
with a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 damage claim); see also MOTOMURA, supra note 165, at 46-47, 56-57
(chronicling these legal strategies).
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fairness rather than on formal legality.283 To secure these rights, entire
communities actively work to reconstitute themselves in ways that insu-
late them from unwanted interventions. This is reflected not just in the
ongoing, and somewhat successful, efforts to narrow the scope of the
Secure Communities program and jail screening programs but also in
movements opposing gang injunction programs, "prostitution free
zones," and other initiatives that might otherwise increase policing in
liminal communities.284 The rights-protective strategies at issue here
identify particular policies and practices that exacerbate the vulnerabili-
ties of liminal legal populations and work to change them by developing
new markers of community belonging285 and by privileging accounts of
community need that incorporate the voices of liminal legal subjects.
CONCLUSION
Although it is not possible to create a full map of the world of limi-
nal legality in one short piece, this Article identifies salient and recurring
features of liminal legality, describes various sites where liminal legality
is produced, and suggests some possible benefits to using an expansive
283. There are formal legal frameworks that anchor these claims, of course. Sometimes these
are rooted in the Constitution. See MOTOMURA, supra note 165, at 7, 64-65, 134-35, 141-42 (dis-
cussing federalism, procedural due process, and the constitutional rights of citizens). International
law norms serves as another important source of this rights-claiming, notwithstanding the lack of
coherent "architecture" around the rights of noncitizens. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Interna-
tional Legal Norms on Migration: Substance Without Architecture, in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
LAW: DEVELOPING PARADIGMS AND KEY CHALLENGES 467, 471-75, 479 (Ryszard Cholewinski, et
al. eds., 2007).
284. See, e.g., Dean Spade, The Only Way to End Racialized Gender Violence in Prison Is to
End Prisons: A Response to Russell Robinson 's "Masculinity as Prison", 3 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT
184, 193-95 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing to progressive decriminalization and
policing-containment strategies and organizations, and arguing that these "organizations and projects
understand the significant dangers queer, trans, and gender non-conforming people face at the hands
of law enforcement and seek to offer material relief by helping people survive these systems, dis-
mantling the pathways to criminalization that entangle vulnerable people, and creating alternative
ways for people to get their needs met given that the criminal punishment system promises safety but
never delivers"). The Black Lives Matter movement is the most visible contemporary national
movement that explicitly seeks to address these structural issues, and it has done so by privileging
the experiences and centering the rights of the most marginalized and most legally liminal members
of the community. See BLACK LIVES MATTER, http://blacklivesmatter.com (last visited Dec. 3,
2015) ("Black Lives Matter affirms the lives of Black queer and trans folks, disabled folks, Black-
undocumented folks, folks with records, women and all Black lives along the gender spectrum. It
centers those that have been marginalized within Black liberation movements. It is a tactic to
(re)build the Black liberation movement.")
285. The adoption of municipal ID cards to facilitate the integration of noncitizens who lack
other legal forms of identification is one such strategy. Michael J. Wishnie, Remarks at the Denver
University Law Review Crimmigration Symposium (Feb. 2, 2015), available at http://du-
denverlaw.hosted.panopto.com/Panopto/Pages/Viewer.aspx?id=93a85392-078a-414e-84bd-
5607b4fb08d3; see also Thomas MacMillan, Elm City ID Card Turns 5, NEW HAVEN INDEP., July
23, 2012, http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/idcardanniversary/
("Five years and 10,000 cards later, doomsday predictions have long fizzled out, leaving a stronger
community along with a new challenge-keeping the card useful and relevant, rather than largely
symbolic for most of its bearers."). On the challenges of keeping these programs vibrant, see Brian
Charles, Many Unaware ofNew Haven's Elm City ID Program, Critics Say, NEW HAVEN REGISTER,
Sept. 21, 2014, http://www.nhregister.com/general-news/20140921/many-unaware-of-new-havens-
elm-city-id-program-critics-say.
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conception of liminal legality to assess the social and legal developments
that both exacerbate and mediate its destabilizing effects. Many commu-
nity organizers are already ahead of scholars in recognizing the genera-
tive potential of organizing around analogous and complimentary experi-
ences of legal liminality. To identify law reform projects that can help
advance social justice goals, legal scholars should also think creatively
and trans-substantively about the legal sites that produce liminal legality.

